Missouri’s Sacrificial Lamb: Political Party Contributions and Campaign Finance Reform in Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb by Marsh, Jeremy
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 45 
Number 3 Teaching Torts (Summer 2001) Article 18 
5-1-2001 
Missouri’s Sacrificial Lamb: Political Party Contributions and 
Campaign Finance Reform in Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb 
Jeremy Marsh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeremy Marsh, Missouri’s Sacrificial Lamb: Political Party Contributions and Campaign Finance Reform in 
Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 45 St. Louis U. L.J. (2001). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol45/iss3/18 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information, 
please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
925 
MISSOURI’S SACRIFICIAL LAMB: POLITICAL PARTY 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN 
MISSOURI REPUBLICAN PARTY V. LAMB 
He was led like a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is 
silent, so he did not open his mouth.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The state of Missouri most likely did not intend to lead its statewide party 
organizations to the slaughter, but its campaign finance statute created a 
similar effect to that described in the Bible.  On the altar of reform, the state of 
Missouri tried to silence its political parties by significantly limiting what they 
could contribute to their candidates in a campaign for elective office.  With the 
First Amendment in hand, the Eighth Circuit prevented Missouri’s sacrifice.  
Relying partly on the Supreme Court’s seminal campaign finance reform case, 
Buckley v. Valeo,2 the Eighth Circuit found Missouri’s limits on parties 
unconstitutional in Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb.3 
Since Buckley, courts have struggled mightily with its application, finding 
it difficult to determine the constitutionality of subsequent campaign finance 
reforms passed by both Congress and the states.4  The primary reason for this 
is that in Buckley, the Supreme Court decided that any limitation of campaign 
spending triggers First Amendment scrutiny because money is required for 
political communication; thus, a limitation on its use in campaigns amounts to 
a limitation on political speech.  The most criticized aspect of the Court’s 
extensive decision in Buckley was the constitutionally significant distinction it 
made between campaign contributions,5 which could be limited under the First 
 
 1. Isaiah 53:7b. 
 2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 3. 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000), application for stay denied sub nom.  Nixon v. Missouri 
Republican Party, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000) [hereinafter Lamb III].  As of publication of this Note, 
Missouri’s petition for writ of certiorari was pending.  See Petitions for Writ of Certiorari Pending 
at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/reports/cert.  See infra Part III.D for a discussion of Missouri’s 
petition and the Missouri Republican Party’s response. 
 4. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance, the Parties and the Court: A Comment on 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Elections Commission, 14 
CONST. COMMENT. 91, 92 (1997) [hereinafter Briffault, Comment]. 
 5. A contribution is essentially a gift.  The Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) 
provides that a person may contribute up to $20,000 per year to the national committees of a 
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Amendment in order to prevent corruption, and independent campaign 
expenditures,6 which could not be limited, due to the absence of the same 
corruption risk.7  Using these two labels, the Supreme Court invalidated a large 
portion of the Federal Elections and Campaign Act (FECA),8 which 
significantly weakened its comprehensive scheme and left standing only 
restrictions on individual and group contributions.9 
These labels continue to govern the Supreme Court’s campaign finance 
reform jurisprudence today, as demonstrated by a series of Supreme Court 
cases decided after Buckley.  In most of the cases since Buckley, the Court has 
been confronted only with independent expenditures and has found the limits 
unconstitutional.  Last year, however, the Court upheld Missouri’s limits on 
contributions in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (Shrink II).10 
The Supreme Court recently reconsidered a challenge to the 
constitutionality of coordinated expenditures11—a middle category between 
independent expenditures and contributions that the FECA created solely for 
political parties.12  In 1996, the Court decided Colorado Republican Federal 
Campaign Committee v. Federal Elections Commission (Colorado Republican 
I) and remanded the portion of the case dealing with coordinated 
expenditures.13  It was in this case that the Court received its first opportunity 
to consider campaign finance reform in the party-candidate context.  As it 
prepares to rule on this issue again, perhaps the Court will be influenced by the 
Eighth Circuit’s ground-breaking decision in Missouri Republican Party v. 
 
political party and up to $5000 per year to state party committees for activities in connection with 
federal elections.  2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)(B)-(C) (1994). 
 6. Independent expenditures are expenditures not in cooperation, consultation or concert 
with a candidate.  Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 94.  Some questions exist as to whether a 
political party can make truly independent expenditures.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Beck, at 
4 n.2, Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2000) (No. 00-
191), available at 2000 WL 1792974. 
 7. Id. at 98. 
 8. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994). 
 9. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6-8, 20-21. 
 10. 528 U.S. 377, 384-85 [hereinafter Shrink II]. 
 11. FECA allows political parties to make limited coordinated expenditures in connection 
with a campaign.  2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1994). 
 12. On February 28, 2000, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. 
granted, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000) [hereinafter Colorado Republican II], a case in which, on remand 
from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit declared unconstitutional a provision of FECA which 
limited coordinated spending (defined as a contribution by the FEC) between a political party and 
a candidate.  The Court’s opinion will likely be issued by the end of June of 2001.  U.S. High 
Court Considers Party Spending Limits, REUTERS, available at http://news.findlaw.com/ 
legalnews/s/20010228/courtpolitics.html. 
 13. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 
625 (1996). 
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Lamb.  Table 1 illustrates the evolution of the Supreme Court’s campaign 
finance jurisprudence with respect to the type of spending being regulated. 
 
Table 1: Supreme Court Holdings on Campaign Spending Limits Compared to 
The Eighth Circuit’s Holding in Lamb 
Limits on: 
Independent 
Expenditures 
Coordinated 
Expenditures 
Contributions 
Buckley v. Valeo (1976) Unconstitutional Constitutional Constitutional 
California Medical Association v. 
FEC (1981)14 
Unconstitutional   
FEC v. Nat’l Conservative 
Political Action Comm: (1986)15 
Unconstitutional   
Colorado Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm. v. FEC (1996) 
Unconstitutional Remanded  
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t 
PAC (2000)16 
  Constitutional 
Missouri Republican Party v. 
Lamb (8th Cir. 2000) 
  Unconstitutional 
FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm. (2001) 
 
To Be 
Determined 
 
 
 
 14. 453 U.S. 182 (1981) [hereinafter CalMed].  In CalMed, four members of the Court 
expressed the view that nothing in FECA restricts the amount that a political action committee 
(PAC) can independently expend to advocate political views.  However, these members of the 
Court were not persuaded by the California Medical Association’s argument that its “speech by 
proxy” through its own PAC was entitled to full First Amendment protection.  Id. at 195-96.  
Consequently, these members of the Court maintained that FECA could constitutionally restrict 
the amount an association can contribute to its PAC.  Id. at 184. 
 15. 470 U.S. 480 (1984) [hereinafter NCPAC].  In NCPAC, the Court again found that a 
limitation on a political committee’s independent expenditures in support of a candidate were 
unconstitutional absent an indication that such expenditures have a tendency to corrupt or to give 
the appearance of corruption.  Id. at 497-98. 
 16. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).  In Shrink II, the Court found Missouri’s limits on individual 
contributions constitutional, concluding that the state statute was not void for lack of evidence 
where the legitimacy of the state’s interest was so well-accepted in the Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence.  Id. at 384.  Moreover, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s assumption that 
Buckley set a minimum constitutional threshold for contribution limits, finding that Missouri’s 
limits were not too low to allow for effective political advocacy.  Id. at 396. 
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The Eighth Circuit has considered more campaign finance reform cases 
than any other circuit.17  Consistently finding the challenged reforms 
unconstitutional, the Eighth Circuit has earned a reputation for placing a high 
evidentiary burden on the state before allowing any abridgement of the First 
Amendment free speech rights associated with campaign spending.18 
In Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb (Lamb III), the Eighth Circuit 
considered the issue of contributions made by political parties to candidates, an 
issue upon which the Supreme Court has never directly ruled.  In finding 
Missouri’s limit on the amount parties can contribute to candidates 
unconstitutional, the court once again put itself at the forefront of a debate 
about campaign finance reform that has been churning in our nation’s 
legislatures, courts and halls of academia for the past three decades.19  This 
debate may come to a head in the current Supreme Court term, when the Court 
will directly consider the party-candidate relationship in the context of 
campaign finance reform.20 
Lamb III is a product of comprehensive legislation passed by the Missouri 
Legislature in 1994.21  Using FECA as a model, the bill limited, among other 
 
 17. See, e.g., Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. 
Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995); Russell v. 
Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998); Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th 
Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Shrink I]. 
 18. See D. Bruce LaPierre, Raising a New First Amendment Hurdle for Campaign Finance 
“Reform,” 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217 (1998) (explaining that the ACLU of Eastern Missouri has 
successfully encouraged the Eighth Circuit to adopt a “real harm” standard when considering 
Missouri’s, and other states’, justifications for various campaign finance reforms) [hereinafter 
LaPierre, First Amendment Hurdle].  See also Matthew S. Criscimagna, Note, The Narrow 
Application of Buckley v. Valeo: Is Campaign Finance Reform Possible in the Eighth Circuit?, 
64 MO. L. REV. 437 (1999) (discussing the high standard placed on state campaign finance 
regulations by the Eighth Circuit). 
 19. See, e.g., Politicians For Rent, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 23; Jill Abramson, The 
Nation: Following the Money; For McCain, Now’s the Time. But Bush?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2001, at 16; Robert Dreyfuss, Harder Than Soft Money, AM. PROSPECT, Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 30; 
Linda Greenhouse, Court Agrees to Review Restrictions on Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2000, 
at A20; Josh Goldstein, Campaign Financing Bill Moving Forward With McCain at Helm, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 28, 2001; FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS 
AND REALITIES (1992) [hereinafter SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE].  In addition, at least 
five different law reviews have hosted symposiums on campaign finance reform and other 
election law issues in the last two years.  Symposium, Money, Politics, and Equality, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 1603 (1999), Symposium, The Law and Economics of Elections, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533 
(1999); A Symposium: The Legal and Political Implications of Buckley v. Valeo, 33 AKRON L. 
REV. 1 (1999); Symposium: Law and Political Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (2000); 
Symposium, Election Law, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 20. The Court is expected to issue its Colorado Republican II opinion by the end of June of 
2001. See supra note 12.  For a discussion of the oral arguments, see infra Part II.C. 
 21. Appellee’s Brief at 3, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 
2000) (No. 00-2686). 
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things, the amount of cash and in-kind support a political party could 
contribute to one of its candidates.22  After violating the limits in 1998, the 
Missouri Republican Party (the Party) challenged them on constitutional 
grounds.23  The district court awarded summary judgment to the state, basing 
its decision on Shrink II’s holding that limits on contributions are 
presumptively constitutional.24  The Eighth Circuit, on appeal, also fit the 
Party’s spending into the contribution category, but announced that the identity 
of the contributor distinguished Lamb III from Shrink II in a crucial way.25  
Stressing the differences between an individual contribution and a party 
contribution, the court found a weightier free speech right in the party context, 
which enabled it to impose the higher evidentiary burden for which it has 
become known.26  Finding that the state failed to meet the burden necessary to 
justify this abridgement of the Party’s speech and associational rights, the court 
held Missouri’s limits on a party’s cash and in-kind contributions constituted a 
violation of the First Amendment.27 
This Note discusses both the political and constitutional issues that were at 
stake in deciding Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb.  After describing the 
political and legal landscape of campaign finance reform, including the 
McCain-Feingold legislative effort and Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit 
precedent in Part II, it discusses the facts and holding of the instant case in Part 
III.  Part III examines the arguments made in the case, both at the district court 
level, and then by the majority and dissent at the circuit court level.  In Part IV, 
this Note analyzes these arguments, including a discussion of the contribution 
expenditure distinction and of the past and present role of the American 
political party in electoral politics. This Note argues that the decision made by 
the Eighth Circuit was the correct one.  The district court’s approach, which 
allowed the type or category of spending to be dispositive, with no regard 
given to the identity of the contributor, failed to account for political realities 
and for the important role of the political party28 in every state and in America 
 
 22. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1162 (E.D. Mo. 1999) 
[hereinafter Lamb I]. 
 23. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter 
Lamb III]. 
 24. Lamb I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. 
 25. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1072. 
 26. Id. at 1072. 
 27. Id. at 1074. 
 28. FECA defines a political party as “an association, committee or organization which 
nominates a candidate for election to any Federal office whose name appears on the election 
ballot as the candidate of such association, committee, or organization.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(16) 
(1994). 
  The strength of America’s major political parties appears to be an unsettled debate.  
Most would agree with a number of political scientists who recently observed that the “two major 
political parties and their legislative campaign committees (LCCs) are among the most important 
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as a whole.  The recent election highlighted that important role in a manner 
few of us could have anticipated.  Although the U.S. Constitution does not 
specifically mention political parties, the Eighth Circuit did not err in giving 
parties special accord.  Its conclusion that political party contribution limits 
should be analyzed differently than individual contribution limits, because of 
the unique relationship between parties and candidates and the low risk of 
corruption, was proper.  In addition to the constitutional issue, this Note will 
show that allowing the parties to contribute freely to their candidates enhances 
the accountability that voters can have over elected officials and the party they 
support.  This creates a healthy democracy, and, by removing the need for 
politicians to seek contributions from more narrow, less accountable entities 
such as individuals and PACs, actually removes some of the potential for 
corruption that exists where political party contribution limits are in place. 
II.  THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. Where We Are: McCain-Feingold and “The Corruption of American 
Politics” 
In 1999, well-known political journalist Elizabeth Drew wrote a book 
entitled The Corruption of American Politics: What Went Wrong and Why.29  
Decrying the current state of affairs with mostly anecdotal evidence, Drew 
reflected many people’s belief that “the money culture” has deeply and perhaps 
mortally affected American politics.30  Among money’s pernicious effects, 
Drew listed the following: it influences the issues raised and their outcome, 
distracts congressional members, directs career choices and subverts values.31  
She wrote: “The culture of money dominates Washington as never before; 
money now rivals or even exceeds power as the preeminent goal.”32  While 
there is disagreement over what should be done about this situation, few would 
 
players in our electoral landscape.”  Brief of Amici Curiae Beck, at 3-4, Federal Election 
Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2000) (No. 00-191), available at 2000 
WL 1792974.  In a comparative sense, however, one might conclude that America’s parties are 
far weaker than they could be.  Politicians for Rent, supra note 19, at 23 (claiming that America 
is unique in that political parties play a relatively small role in financing campaigns, noting that 
most candidates raise the money themselves). 
 29. ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG 
AND WHY (1999). 
 30. Id. at 61. 
 31. Id. at 61-65.  Interestingly, each party itself contributes to the perception that the other is 
corrupt by charging that the other party is “in the pockets” of certain special interests, such as trial 
lawyers or tobacco.  By making such charges, the parties are contributing to the public perception 
that contributions to political parties can corrupt members of Congress.  Brief of Amici Curiae 
Beck, at 18, Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2001) (No. 
00-191), available at 2000 WL 1792974. 
 32. DREW, supra note 29, at 61. 
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argue with Drew’s contention that something is seriously wrong with the 
campaign finance system she blames for these woes.33  As more policy-makers 
have realized the direness of the situation, the impetus for campaign finance 
reform has grown such that one can be fairly certain that the newly elected 
107th Congress will produce a campaign finance reform bill.  The question 
becomes: Will it meaningfully address the problems in a constitutional 
manner?  The most well-known of the reform proposals is, of course, the 
McCain-Feingold bill, with its crusading and controversial Republican 
sponsor, Arizona Senator John McCain.  Aided by a recent election filled with 
abnormalities, Senator McCain has succeeded in elevating the issue of 
campaign and election reform to the top of the legislative agenda.34  In fact, his 
bill, which had three co-sponsors last year, had just been passed in the 
Senate—by a comfortable 59 to 41 margin—when this Note went to 
publication.35  Before examining the merits of the different legislative 
proposals being made and their bearing on the party-candidate relationship, 
one must understand the pressures that bear on this endeavor, making 
meaningful campaign finance reform an extremely difficult prospect. 
The debate over campaign finance reform centers around two goals and 
two pressures, the collective sums of which appear to be irreconcilable.  The 
reformers’ goals are two-fold: (1) to create a neater and tidier political culture 
void of corruption or pollution; and (2) to create a greater measure of political 
equality, thus leveling the political playing field.36  Skeptics have denounced 
both of these goals as impossible, due to the following pressures: (1) the 
pressure exerted by money itself, which will almost certainly remain a constant 
means of influencing elections; and (2) the pressure exerted by the First 
Amendment, the presence of which seriously hampers the political equality 
rationale for reform.  The first pressure is a function of the fact that political 
money will seek an outlet.  The hope that reform will lessen the amount of 
money spent on American elections is simply untenable in a capitalistic 
country with as much wealth as ours and with a constitutional guarantee of the 
 
 33. See John Copeland Nagle, Corruption, Pollution and Politics: The Corruption of 
American Politics: What Went Wrong and Why, 110 YALE L.J. 293, 305 (2000) (reviewing 
DREW, supra note 29). 
 34. See Helen Dewar, McCain to Plow Ahead on Campaign Finance Reform; Push for Bill 
is a Challenge to Bush, Congress, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2001, at A2; Amy Keller & John 
Bresnahan, McCain Gets Date Certain on Reform Bill But Reformers Worry New Panel May 
Delay Action on Campaign Finance Reform, ROLL CALL, Jan. 29, 2001. 
 35. Alison Mitchell, Campaign Finance Bill Passes in Senate, 59-41; House Vows a Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001 at A-1.  See also S.27, Bill Summary and Status for 107th Congress, at 
http://Thomas.loc.gov [hereinafter S.27]. 
 36. See, e.g., E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Richard L. Hasen, Introduction: Money, Politics, and 
Equality, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1603, 1604 (1999).  In this introduction of a symposium about the 
three issues identified in the title, Professor Rosenkranz, the Executive Director of the Brennan 
Center for Justice at New York University, defended the political equality rationale. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
932 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:925 
right to spend that money however one wants.  While few people are 
comfortable with the amount of money that is currently being spent on 
campaigns,37 it is unrealistic to believe that the amount can somehow be 
dammed.  This phenomenon caused one critic to exclaim: “The history of 
‘campaign finance reform’ is that every limit inspires new evasions.”38  
Academics have given various labels to such evasions including “unintended 
consequences,”39 “undemocratic consequences”40 and “substitution effects.”41  
Indeed, the pressure exerted by the never-ending flow of money causes even 
those who sympathize with reform efforts to conclude that a bill like McCain-
Feingold, which focuses on soft money,42 would have little effect on the real 
 
 37. More than one billion dollars was spent on last year’s Presidential campaign alone.  
Editorial, Campaign Finance, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 2, 2001, at 2.  National 
Public Radio recently reported that the two parties together raised and spent more than $750 
million in hard money in the last election cycle.  In a brief interview, Fred Wertheimer, President 
of Democracy 21, a pro-reform group, argued that a sum this large shows to what degree conduit 
corruption through a party is possible in the absence of limits on coordinated expenditures.  Jan 
Baran, the lawyer who recently argued on behalf of the Colorado Republican Party before the 
Supreme Court countered that “[i]t is a fact of life that reaching millions of voters who are busy 
and are not particularly attentive to political messages is a costly and complicated process.  And 
it’s going to cost a lot of money.” Interview on National Public Radio, Morning Edition (Feb. 28, 
2001). 
 38. Robert J. Samuelson, Editorial, Campaign Finance Hysteria, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1999, 
at A29. 
 39. William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 335, 343-45 (2000).  Professor Marshall argues that the law of unintended consequences has 
particular force in this arena because the pressure of money on the system is inevitable, and 
political money will seek an outlet.  He lists a number of adverse unintended consequences 
including: funds diverted from candidates to special interest groups; issue advocacy, which 
restricts a candidate’s control over her campaign; massive increases in the amount of time 
candidates must spend raising money; and a practice called “bundling,” whereby well-connected 
persons amass hard money from a number of contributors and present it to the candidate in one 
package.  Id. 
 40. Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign 
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1072 (1996) [hereinafter Smith, Faulty Assumptions].  
Professor Smith lists the following as undemocratic consequences of campaign finance reform: it 
entrenches the status quo, making it more difficult for challengers; it makes the electoral system 
less responsive to public opinion; it enhances the power of a select group of elites; it favors 
independently wealthy candidates; and it limits opportunities for grassroots political activity.  Id. 
 41. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 325 
(1998) [hereinafter Sullivan, Against Reform].  Professor Sullivan’s substitution effects parallel 
the “consequences” listed by Professors Marshall and Smith.  For example, she lists issue 
advocacy, which is funded by independent expenditures, and soft money as two of the non-
accountable effects of spending limits.  Id. at 325. 
 42. FECA allows individuals or groups to contribute unlimited amounts of “soft money” to 
political parties on grassroots, party-building activities such as producing buttons, bumper 
stickers, brochures, posters and holding voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives.  2 U.S.C. 
§§ 431(8)(B)(x-xii), 9(B)(xiii-ix) (1994).  In contrast, the term “hard money” has come to 
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world because the $400 million spent on soft money contributions would 
simply be spent in other ways to influence electoral politics.43  Another of the 
“unintended consequences” caused by a spending limit-oriented reform agenda 
is that it makes it more difficult for challengers to mount effective campaigns 
against well-entrenched incumbents.  This problem hints at the inevitable 
conflict of interest that occurs when elected officials are put in charge of 
enacting reforms that affect their own prospects for re-election.44 
While the effects of spending limits are manifold, perhaps the biggest 
obstacle to campaign finance reform and political equality in America is the 
First Amendment.  One commentator recently wrote that “[a]s long as we have 
the First Amendment, the effort to regulate elections—under the guise of 
‘campaign finance reform’—is futile, self-defeating, and undesirable.”45  
Indeed, the First Amendment guarantee of free political speech would appear 
to be an insurmountable obstacle to creating effective limits on campaign 
spending.  This is so because regardless of how much hard or soft money 
contributions are limited, the First Amendment will not allow the limitation of 
a person or group’s independent spending.46  Thus, it is reasonable to conclude 
that no matter how hard the reformers try to enact campaign finance reform, 
the result will not be to their liking because only a certain fraction of the world 
of political money can come under Congress’s hand.  This fact caused Bradley 
A. Smith, the current Commissioner of the Federal Elections Commission, to 
state what is obvious to many but not all.  He stated that “[t]he First 
Amendment does not . . . promise a neat and tidy system of elections.”47  
 
characterize the type of spending that comes under FECA limits, such as contributions and 
coordinated expenditures.  Even though soft money is the focus of the current legislative debate, 
this Note will limit its analysis to limits on hard money contributions by parties to candidates. 
 43. Robert Dreyfuss, Reforming Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 18, 2000, at 26. 
 44. Marshall, supra note 39, at 336.  See also Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: 
Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1278-79 (1994) 
(suggesting that a “premise of distrust” is appropriate when looking at campaign finance reform 
due to the conflict of interest) [hereinafter BeVier, Specious Arguments]. 
 45. Samuelson, supra note 38, at A29. 
 46. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-49 (1976).  Independent advocacy in the form of 
expenditures, explained the Buckley Court, does not propose a danger of corruption because it is 
carried out independently of the candidate and his or her campaign.  The Court noted that such 
expenditures may provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and may even prove 
counterproductive.  The Court added that the absence of prearrangement and coordination of an 
expenditure with the candidate alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro 
quo for improper commitments from the candidate.  Having made this observation, the Court 
concluded that the independent expenditure limitation of the FECA impermissibly burdened the 
First Amendment.  Id. at 46-48. 
 47. Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 40, at 1090.  Against the wishes of many 
reformers, Smith, a libertarian law professor and opinion leader for those favoring de-regulation 
of campaign finance laws, was installed as the FEC commissioner last year.  It is both ironic and 
interesting that the individual most responsible for enforcing campaign finance laws believes 
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Campaign finance reformers focusing on the untidiness of the process have 
responded with an ever-growing web of regulation, the undemocratic result of 
which, he claimed, has been an even more disconnected and cynical American 
public.48  Political equality proponents, nevertheless, counter that efforts to 
level the playing field and make the system more fair through spending limits 
and public funding are the remedy for such disconnectedness.  Everyone 
agrees that political equality is a praiseworthy ideal and worth shooting for; 
however, it would seem that the best means for attaining it, due to the 
existence of the First Amendment, are the very opposite means of those 
favored by limit-oriented reformers.  This is so because the removal of limits, 
coupled with aggressive disclosure, would stem the tide of political money 
being spent outside of the accountable fraction of the world of political 
money.49 
In light of these pressures, one must ask how the 107th Congress should 
address what so many perceive to be the cause of the “corruption of American 
politics,”—the current campaign finance system.  One can only hope that 
Congress will not create more “undemocratic consequences” by simply adding 
to the web of regulation that already exists,50 but rather, that the structures of 
our Constitution, as well as the realities of our political and economic life, will 
inform its debate.  When this Note was published, debate in the Senate had just 
been completed on McCain-Feingold-Cochran51 and three rival plans, in 
addition to amendments.52  At issue were primarily soft money limits, in 
addition to hard money contribution limits, issue advocacy,53 and a new 
 
those laws should be repealed.  The main point of his many writings is that people have a basic 
right to unfettered political speech.  Since his appointment, Smith has succeeded in relaxing some 
of the rules, arguably making an already weak regulatory organization even weaker.  Eliza 
Newlin Carney, The Anti-Reformers, THE NAT’L J., Feb. 17, 2001, at 474-75. 
 48. Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 40, at 1090. 
 49. Professor Sullivan argues in another article that strong and immediate disclosure 
requirements coupled with the law of diminishing marginal returns is the only real answer to the 
campaign finance reform conundrum.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of 
Speech: A Reply to Frank Askin, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1998).  She concluded that 
“[a]s in other areas, such as the regulation of hate speech and pornography, there are limits to how 
far the regulation of speech can be made to do the work of altering underlying problems of 
material inequality.”  Id. 
 50. See Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 40, at 1090. 
 51. Influential Mississippi Republican Senator Thad Cochran’s name was recently added to 
the title. 
 52. Keller & Bresnahan, supra note 34.  See also Senate Opening Triggers Campaign 
Finance Reform Battle, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Jan. 24, 2001. 
 53. Issue advocacy is the title given to the practice of running television advertisements that 
do not expressly “advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 44.  Because the Supreme Court, in Buckley, limited the scope of FECA regulation to 
express advocacy, “issue advocacy” lacking certain magic words such as “vote for” or “vote 
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disclosure regime.54  As passed by the Senate, the McCain-Feingold bill would 
not further the cause of political party involvement in campaign spending.  In 
fact, arguably the foremost targets of the bill are the political parties.55  The 
bill’s provisions not only ban all soft money donations to political parties and 
certain types of issue advocacy, they also only marginally increase the twenty-
five-year-old limits on political party hard money contributions and 
coordinated expenditures.56  The debates have already demonstrated that one 
challenge for Congress will be to draft a bill that can withstand First 
Amendment scrutiny.  Another challenge will be to draft a bill that adequately 
takes into account political and legal realities, including the important role that 
political parties can and should play in the conduct of elections and the 
guarantees of the First Amendment. 
 
against” has become an important means by which parties, political action committees, and 
corporations support candidates. 
 54. See Dewar, supra note 34, at A2; S.27, supra note 35.  Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel’s 
bill, S.22, entitled the Open and Accountable Campaign Financing Act of 2001, focused on 
revised (monthly) reporting requirements and includes increased contribution limits and a 
$60,000 per year limit on soft money contributions.  See S.22, Bill Summary and Status for the 
107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.gov.  Senator McCain claims that his two top priorities, 
which he believes would remove ninety percent of the problem, are first, to ban soft money and 
second, to address independent campaigns and issue advocacy by which radical groups launch 
attack advertisements.  Interview on CNBC, Tim Russert (Feb. 10, 2001).  Arguably, a ban on 
issue advocacy would violate the First Amendment.  Editorial, A Flinch on Campaign Finance, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2001, at A-32. 
 55. Richard Loving, A Spoiler’s Crusade: Senator John McCain and “The System”, NAT’L 
REV., Feb. 19, 2001, at 30-32.  The author of this cover story described McCain as an anti-party 
renegade whose anti-party bill, if passed, would be subject to numerous court challenges.  He 
called campaign finance reform “an adjustment to a set of arcane rules that never should have 
been written in the first place and that no one outside of the directly affected interests feels 
compelled to pay attention to, let alone understand . . . as a matter of McCain’s own stated goals, 
it is a contradiction, a check on exactly the active citizenship he seeks to promote.” 
  Conservative columnist George Will recently stated the premise of McCain-Feingold is 
that “[s]omething is inherently corrupt about the relationship between political parties and 
candidates.”  George Will, ‘Feeble Councils’ Want Bush to Fumble on First Amendment, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 5, 2001, at C-19.  Senator Mitch McConnell, on the day McCain-
Feingold was passed, pronounced the following malediction on the final bill: “What we have 
done here, in an effort to get the money out of politics, is to get the parties out of politics . . . 
welcome to the brave new world, where the voices of the parties are quieted, the voices of the 
billionaires are enhanced, the voices of the newspapers are enhanced.”  See Mitchell, supra note 
35, at A-1. 
 56. S.27, supra note 35.  See also Mitchell, supra note 35, at A-1.  The limits on how much 
an individual can give to a federal candidate would rise from $1000 a year to $2000 a year and 
the limits on how much an individual can cumulatively give to candidates and parties would rise 
from $25,000 a year to $37,500 a year.  Id. 
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B. Where We’ve Been: FECA, Buckley and Eighth Circuit Shrinkage 
1. The Federal Elections Campaign Act 
The Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) was passed in 1971 in 
response to a perceived need to address the campaign abuses that plagued the 
election process in the late 1960s.57  Designed to replace the 1925 Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act,58 the FECA, with its emphasis on disclosure, failed to 
specify its own effective date, leading to more campaign finance abuses after 
its passage.59  In fact, it later became clear that President Nixon received more 
than eleven million dollars in illegal corporate contributions after passage of 
the FECA, during the 1972 presidential campaign.60  This, in addition to the 
Watergate scandal, also paid for by illegally received funds, gave rise to the 
1974 FECA amendments which pushed for much tighter restrictions on 
campaign financing itself.61  The amendments limited most forms of campaign 
spending, including individual, party and PAC contributions to candidates, 
personal spending by candidates and independent spending by groups not 
affiliated with the campaign.62  Moreover, the amendments set overall 
campaign spending ceilings in federal elections.63 
This comprehensive scheme, however, was never fully adopted due to the 
legal challenge that ensued soon after its passage.  In Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Supreme Court used the First Amendment to strike down limits on independent 
campaign spending, limits on a candidate’s own spending of personal funds 
and mandatory campaign spending ceilings.64  Only the contribution limits, 
disclosure requirements and voluntary system of public funding survived, 
causing some to question the surviving bill’s workability.65  Despite its 
 
 57. For example, President Richard M. Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign was fueled 
primarily by a $2.8 million gift by an individual, Clement Stone, and his wife.  SORAUF, INSIDE 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 19, at 4. 
 58. 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-256 (1926) (repealed 1972). 
 59. Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform: The General Landscape: The Siren’s 
Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 24 (1997) 
[hereinafter Smith, Siren’s Song]. 
 60. Id.  The Nixon campaign had refused to disclose contributions made to it during the 
period just prior to the FECA’s effective date.  When it was finally forced to do so, the campaign 
committee revealed that it received eleven million dollars during that period, mostly in the form 
of large contributions and much of it in the last forty-eight hours before FECA took effect.  Id. 
 61. Id. at 25. 
 62. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976). 
 65. Id.  Chief Justice Warren Burger began his dissent as follows: 
By dissecting this Act bit by bit, and casting off vital parts, the Court fails to recognize 
that the whole of this Act is greater than the sum of its parts.  Congress intended to 
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shortcomings, the basic FECA framework, as it emerged from Buckley, 
remains the core of most campaign finance proposals at both the federal and 
state level,66 most of which include limits on contributions, limits on total 
spending and the use of public funding.67  After Buckley, the only significant 
change to FECA came in 1979 when Congress passed an amendment to allow 
parties to spend so-called “soft” or unregulated money without limit on 
grassroots, party-building activities such as producing buttons, bumper 
stickers, brochures, posters and holding voter registration and get-out-the-vote 
drives.68 
2. The Buckley Framework For Analyzing Campaign Spending 
The framework that Buckley put in place for analyzing the constitutionality 
of campaign finance reforms can be broken down into a familiar three-part 
process.  First, pursuant to its power of judicial review, the Court will analyze 
the ends that Congress seeks to vindicate in creating the regulation.  Second, 
the Court will examine the means Congress uses to regulate.  Finally, the Court 
will decide, based on the constitutional values at stake and the ends and means 
identified, what type of scrutiny to apply to the regulation before it.69  This 
decision dictates the degree to which the Court examines the particular ends 
and means that Congress identifies and, thus, the degree of deference given to 
Congress.  This section will briefly examine how the Court accomplished this 
process in Buckley, the case that set forth the model for analyzing subsequent 
campaign finance reforms. 
 
regulate all aspects of federal campaign finances, but what remains after today’s holding 
leaves no more than a shadow of what Congress contemplated.  I question whether the 
residue leaves a workable program. 
Id. at 235-36. 
 66. Missouri is one of the states that has adopted a FECA-like system of campaign spending 
regulation.  Appellee’s Brief at 3, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(No. 00-2686). 
 67. Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 40, at 1055. 
 68. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(B)(x-xii), 9(B)(xiii-ix) (1994). 
 69. Professor BeVier discussed these three “scope of review” issues in BeVier, Specious 
Arguments, supra note 44, at 1278-79.  Regarding the Court’s scrutiny of legislative ends, she 
said the Court’s failure to insist on a rigorous definition of corruption has expanded the 
legislature’s power to reorder political realities through the mere use of labels.  Regarding the 
Court’s scrutiny of means, she claimed that a premise of distrust is appropriate because legislative 
proposals often have the effect of protecting incumbents.  Hence, she argued the Court should be 
demanding in its evaluation of the means-end relationship (i.e., it should apply strict scrutiny).  In 
addition, she felt it appropriate for the Court to consider practical realities and political 
differences when analyzing such measures, however, she doubted that strict scrutiny could 
withstand political pressure because under it, no reform measures would be able to pass 
constitutional muster.  Id. 
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a. Acceptable Ends: Preventing Corruption or the Appearance of 
Corruption, Not Leveling the Playing Field 
In Buckley, the Court determined that the only rationale for limiting 
political spending is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.70  The Court rejected the political equality rationale, popular 
among many reformers, which argues that limits promote equality of political 
influence, and called this notion “wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”71  
Even though the Court has deemed the prevention of corruption the only 
adequate rationale for campaign finance limitations, neither it nor Congress has 
been able to identify what exactly constitutes corruption.72  Perhaps the closest 
the Court came was in Federal Elections Commission v. National Conservative 
Political Action Committee, where it said the primary hallmark of corruption 
was the notion of a financial “quid pro quo” marked by the exchange or 
appearance of an exchange of dollars for political favors between donors and 
elected officials.73  In certain contexts the Court has accepted a broader 
meaning of corruption by viewing it as undue influence on the outcome of an 
 
 70. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
 71. Id. at 48-49.  See also Smith, Siren’s Song, supra note 59, at 42.  Professor Smith offered 
a critique of the political equality rationale.  He likened the political equality rationale to the 
siren’s song that enticed the sailors in Homer’s Odyssey, concluding that while the music of the 
reformers (sirens) is sweet—political equality and the end to corruption, scandal and nastiness in 
American politics—the promise is unfulfilled and the quest carries with it a very high price.  Id. 
  Professor Smith never passes up an opportunity to criticize the political equality 
rationale for campaign finance reform.  In another article, he drew a parallel to socialism, noting 
that as efforts to create economic equality impoverished all, causing greater corruption, the effort 
to socialize America’s political dialogue through regulation will also lead to increased corruption, 
more power for the elites at the top and an impoverished political life for everyone else.  Bradley 
A. Smith, Regulation and the Decline of Grassroots Politics, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2000).  
For even more criticism by the current FEC commissioner see generally Smith, Faulty 
Assumptions, supra note 40. 
 72. Nagle, supra note 33, at 316.  In his review of Elizabeth Drew’s book on the corruption 
of American politics, see supra note 29, Professor Nagle identified three distinct meanings of 
corruption: first, corruption as a quid pro quo arrangement; second, corruption as monetary 
influence on the actions of elected officials; and third, corruption as inconsistency with public 
opinion. 
  Professor Nagle went on to criticize Drew’s failure to define what she meant by the 
corruption and then proposed an alternative metaphor, that of pollution.  Pointing out that the 
meaning of corruption is itself a significant point of debate in the Senate, because no Senator is 
ready to acknowledge that he or she has been corrupted, Nagle claimed that the pollution 
metaphor enables one to consider money’s effect on the political environment as a whole rather 
than on individual legislators.  In his article, Nagle analogizes his idea of political pollution to 
environmental and cultural pollution, comparing regulatory approaches to each.  See generally 
Nagle, supra note 33.  See also Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 100 (explaining that the 
Court has failed to adequately define corruption). 
 73. Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 
497 (1984). 
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election that could undermine “the confidence of the people in the democratic 
process and the integrity of the government.”74  In addition, the Court has 
implicitly recognized the “anti-evasion rationale,” based on the understanding 
that preventing circumvention of campaign finance laws (for example, the 
individual contribution limitation)75 is another means by which the state 
prevents the appearance of corruption.76  The state of Missouri used both the 
anti-corruption and the anti-evasion rationales to justify its regulation of 
political parties in Lamb III.77 
b. Acceptable Means: Contribution Limits, Not Expenditure Limits 
In determining whether a regulation implicates First Amendment concerns 
in a manner that makes the regulation unconstitutional, the Court has placed 
great emphasis on the distinction between contributions and expenditures.78  In 
Buckley, the Court established that contributions entail a lower order of speech 
than expenditures.79  It reasoned that contributions can be restricted because 
they do not involve a direct expression of political views, but rather, serve “as 
a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but [do] not 
communicate the underlying basis for the support.”80  The expressive 
component of a contribution, the Court explained, rests solely on the 
undifferentiated symbolic act of contribution; however, the size of the 
contribution does not “increase perceptibly” the quantity of the contributor’s 
communication.81  Moreover, while a contribution may result in political 
speech by a candidate presenting views to voters, “the transformation of 
 
 74. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (dealing with 
contributions made in the corporate context).  See also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition 
for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981).  It is clear that in contexts where 
the Court has accepted a broader meaning of corruption, what the Court is concerned about is 
preventing the appearance of corruption rather than preventing actual corruption. 
 75. Because the individual contribution limit is the lowest, as well as the most common, type 
of regulated campaign spending, it is the type that Congress is most concerned with preventing 
others from circumventing. 
 76. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1981).  In California 
Medical Association (CalMed), Justice Marshall, delivering part of the opinion of the Court, 
noted “Congress enacted [the limitations on contributions to political action committees] in part 
to prevent circumvention of the very limitations on contributions that this court upheld in 
Buckley.”  Id.  See also Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp. 2d 990, 998 (quoting 
Justice Marshall’s CalMed opinion as support for Missouri’s anti-evasion rationale) [hereinafter 
Lamb II].  See infra Part III.B for a discussion of Lamb II. 
 77. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter 
Lamb III]. 
 78. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976).  See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the 
contribution-expenditure distinction. 
 79. Id. at 21. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
940 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:925 
contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 
contributor.”82  The Court has referred to this idea as “speech by proxy.”83  
Regarding contributions, the Court also concluded that they raise the 
possibility of “quid pro quo” corruption because one can easily imagine a large 
contribution being given to secure a political quid pro quo from an 
officeholder.84 
In contrast, because expenditures represent “independent” spending by 
candidates, organizations and individuals on direct communication with voters, 
the Court held them to be core political speech, which did not raise the danger 
of corrupting candidates.85  Thus, Buckley invalidated FECA’s restrictions on 
expenditures by candidates and independent committees.86  Buckley did, 
however, let stand FECA’s regulation of spending “in connection with” an 
election campaign, otherwise known as a coordinated expenditure (the Federal 
Elections Commission (FEC) puts this in the contribution category).87  Not 
surprisingly, this party-specific category eventually became the vehicle by 
which campaign spending in the political party context reached the Supreme 
Court.88 
c. First Amendment “Exacting Scrutiny” 
Campaign finance regulations encroach upon core First Amendment 
concerns of political speech and association.89  Without directly equating 
money to speech, the Court in Buckley found that money was essential for the 
dissemination of political messages and that contributions to campaigns allows 
“like minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common 
political goals.”90  Thus, because campaign spending rises to the level of 
“speech,” government regulation of campaign spending is subject to the 
“exacting scrutiny” required by the First Amendment.91  The Court’s 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. See, e.g., Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981). 
 84. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. 
 85. Id. at 46-48.  See supra note 46 for the Court’s rationale for this conclusion. 
 86. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 97. 
 87. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42-43.  See Richard Briffault, Law and Political Parties: The 
Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 625 (2000) 
(explaining that the FECA does give some degree of special treatment to political parties by 
giving them the ability to make limited coordinated expenditures to candidates, an ability shared 
by no other group or entity). 
 88. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 
(1996). 
 89. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 96. 
 90. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22. 
 91. Id. at 16.  Since Buckley courts have struggled with what level of review is implicated by 
“exacting scrutiny,” strict or intermediate, with respect to different types of campaign finance 
reforms.  See, e.g., Criscimagna, supra note 18 (discussing the level of scrutiny required by the 
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application of exacting scrutiny, however, has been somewhat inexact.92  Due 
to the different categories of campaign spending, the Supreme Court has varied 
both the level of scrutiny and, therefore, the degree of deference given to 
legislative enactments.93  In Buckley, the Court deferred to Congress regarding 
the level of limits on individual contributions to candidates and on the overall 
limit on individual contributions to political committees in a year.94  Regarding 
the amount of the limits, the Court stated that “we cannot require Congress to 
establish that it has chosen the highest reasonable threshold.”95  The size of the 
limit was therefore upheld because it was not wholly without rationality.96  The 
Court, however, has indicated that it is less willing to defer to Congress’s 
judgment or espoused rationale where, for example, the regulation is of 
independent expenditures, a type of campaign spending which it thinks 
deserves greater First Amendment protection and which does not carry the 
same risk of corruption.97  In this situation, the Court will afford little 
deference to legislators and may not even consider any evidence the 
government offers.98 
3. Eighth Circuit Precedent: The Shrinkage of Acceptable Justifications 
for Limits on Campaign Spending 
The Eighth Circuit has considered more cases challenging campaign 
contribution limits than any other circuit, earning a reputation for finding all 
spending limits unconstitutional.99  Some commentators believe that the 
 
Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence and comparing it to the type of scrutiny applied 
by the Eighth Circuit).  See also La Pierre, First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18, at 228-30 
(discussing the “real harm” standard and corresponding strict scrutiny required by the Eighth 
Circuit); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and 
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1985) (explaining that the level of 
review decision reflects the resolution of critically important preliminary issues, which are based 
on the extent to which constitutional rights are implicated) [hereinafter BeVier, Money and 
Politics]. 
 92. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 33, at 329.  According to Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 
528 U.S. 377, 384-85 (2000), the level of scrutiny is uncertain, but it is certainly not the strict 
scrutiny that the Court applies to efforts to regulate various forms of cultural “pollution” that 
implicate the same free speech value, such as violent movies and hate speech.  Id. 
 93. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 103.  In addition, because the constitutional 
question is usually both an empirical and a normative one, the inquiry must include an analysis of 
whether corruption is present in a given situation.  Id. at 102-03. 
 94. Id. at 103. 
 95. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See supra note 46. 
 98. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 103. 
 99. For a more detailed history of campaign finance reform cases in the Eighth Circuit and a 
summary of contribution caps in the United States, see William J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can 
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standard of review in the Eighth Circuit is so strict so as to make campaign 
finance reform limiting contributions  impossible in its jurisdiction.100  Two 
themes have characterized the Eighth Circuit’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence: (1) the contribution limits have been too low and thus not 
“narrowly drawn” to meet the particular state’s interest in combating 
corruption;101 and (2) the state has not been able to demonstrate that the harms 
it is trying to prevent are real.102  As a result of these two themes, states within 
the Eighth Circuit have experienced the shrinkage of options when it comes to 
regulating campaign spending.  One case in particular, Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC v. Adams103 (Shrink I), demonstrates how the Eighth Circuit 
 
You Go?  State Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amendment, 76 B.U. L. REV. 483 
(1996).  See also La Pierre, First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18; Criscimagna, supra note 18. 
 100. See Criscimagna, supra note 18, at 458. 
 101. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).  In Day, the Eighth Circuit struck down 
two Minnesota statutory provisions that limited individual campaign expenditures and 
contributions to political committees each to $100.  The court accepted the state’s anti-corruption 
rationale but found that the requirements of the second part of the Buckley test—the “narrowly 
drawn” requirement—were not met.  The $100 limit, an inflation-adjusted $40.60 compared to 
the $1000 individual limit examined in Buckley, was simply “too low to allow meaningful 
participation in protected political speech and association, and thus was not narrowly tailored to 
serve the state’s legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the political system.”  Id. at 1366.  
Judge Pasco Bowman, the only one of the three judges who did not write an opinion in Lamb III, 
wrote the Day opinion for a unanimous court. 
  In Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit was again 
confronted with low contribution limits, this time as part of an Arkansas statute.  As in Day, the 
court found these limits in violation of the “narrowly drawn” element of Buckley, concluding they 
were too low to enable successful political advocacy in Arkansas.  Russell, 146 F.3d at 571.  
Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold, who wrote the court’s opinion in Lamb III, authored the court’s 
unanimous opinion in Russell. 
 102. In Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), the 
court again held that a statute which limited individual campaign contributions in Missouri to 
$100 to $300 per election cycle was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.  Carver, 72 F.3d at 645. 
  In addition to finding the limits too low, the court required Missouri to meet a high 
evidentiary burden before allowing any abridgement of a person or group’s First Amendment 
rights.  The court stated the government must do more than simply postulate a compelling interest 
when restricting campaign contributions.  Instead, the state had to “demonstrate that the recited 
harms are real . . . and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material 
way.”  Id. at 638 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 
(1995)).  Judge John R. Gibson, the same judge who wrote the dissent in Lamb III, wrote the 
opinion for a unanimous court.  See La Pierre, First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18, at 235-37 
(discussing of the origin of the Eighth Circuit’s real harm standard). 
 103. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Shrink I].  
This case was later overturned by the Supreme Court.  Judge John R. Gibson filed a dissent in this 
case, as he did in Lamb III.  He claimed that the Eighth Circuit gave Carver, an opinion he had 
written, a far too expansive reading.  Because he could not distinguish the Buckley limits on 
individual contributions from Missouri’s limits on such contributions, he would have affirmed the 
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approaches this topic.  In addition, Shrink I provides a means by which to 
compare the Eighth Circuit’s approach to the Supreme Court’s approach, as 
demonstrated in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (Shrink II). 
The plaintiff in Shrink I was a candidate who received funds in excess of 
Missouri’s limits from the Shrink Missouri Government PAC.104  Believing 
that the limits seriously hampered his ability to campaign effectively, he 
alleged that the state’s evidence was insufficient to meet its burden and that the 
limits were unconstitutionally low.105  Using a strict scrutiny standard, the 
Eighth Circuit discounted the evidence proffered by the state as “conclusory 
and self-serving,” holding that the standard, which requires objective proof of 
perceived corruption in Missouri’s political process, was not met.106  In 
addition, relying on its earlier precedent, the court stated the restrictions were 
not narrowly tailored and were too low to allow for effective political dialogue 
in Missouri because they prevented “many candidates from amassing the 
resources necessary for effective advocacy.”107  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to this case, however, and handed down its decision in June of 2000.  
Reversing Shrink I by a 6-3 margin, the Supreme Court decided what some 
commentators believe was the most important campaign finance reform case 
since Buckley.108 
Perhaps not surprisingly, in overturning Shrink I, the Court relied heavily 
on Buckley.109  First, while acknowledging the “exacting scrutiny” called for 
by Buckley, the Court concluded the state statute was not void for lack of 
evidence, where the legitimacy of the espoused state interest was so well-
entrenched in Supreme Court jurisprudence as a justification for contribution 
limits.110  The Court stated that “the quantum of empirical evidence needed to 
 
district court’s ruling and found the limits constitutional (which is what the Supreme Court 
eventually did).  Id. at 524. 
 104. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 383 (2000) [hereinafter Shrink II]. 
 105. Shrink I, 161 F.3d at 523. The contribution limits under challenge in Shrink I were $275, 
$525 or $1075, depending on the office of the person.  Id. at 519. 
 106. Id. at 522. 
 107. Id. at 523 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)). 
 108. See Jane Conrad, Note, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: Campaign 
Contributions, Symbolic Speech and the Appearance of Corruption, 33 AKRON L. REV. 551, 551 
(2000) (arguing that Shrink II was the most important case since Buckley because it was the first 
time the Court considered the constitutionality of limits on individual contributions since then). 
 109. Shrink II, 528 U.S. at 385-90.  Justice Souter authored the opinion for the Court. 
 110. Id. at 391-94.  The Court stated: “Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large, corrupt 
contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor 
implausible.”  Id. at 391.  In essence, what the Court did with respect to the contribution limits at 
issue in Shrink II was take judicial notice of the fact that large political contributions cause 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.  Having done so, the level of proof required was zero.  
See Jeremiah W. Nixon & Paul R. Maguffee, Money Talks: In Defense of a Common-Sense 
Approach to Judicial Review of Campaign Contribution Limits, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 661, 674 
(2000). 
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satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny will vary up or down with the novelty and 
plausibility of the justification raised.”111  Since Missouri’s justification, in the 
individual contribution context, was neither novel nor implausible, the Court 
concluded this was not even a “close call” on the issue of evidentiary 
obligation.112  In addition, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s assumption 
that Buckley set a minimum constitutional threshold for contribution limits, 
calling it a fundamental misunderstanding of the case.113  In sum, the Court 
explained that the “numbers game”114 the Eighth Circuit played in Shrink I and 
previous cases, whereby it compared the inflation adjusted present day limit to 
the $1000 Buckley limit, was a misguided application of Buckley.115  Analyzing 
the size of the limits properly, the Court concluded that these limits were not so 
low as to impede a candidate’s ability to conduct effective advocacy.116 
C. Where We’re Going: Colorado Republican II and Limits in the Party 
Context 
The Supreme Court will almost certainly decide the viability of campaign 
spending limits on political parties this summer when it issues its Colorado 
Republican II opinion.  In Colorado Republican I,117 the Court struggled to 
properly categorize political party expenditures, all of which have 
 
 111. Shrink II, 528 U.S. at 391. 
 112. Id. at 393.  For a critique of the “plausible harm” standard set out by the Court in Shrink 
II, see D. Bruce LaPierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears About ‘Big 
Money’ and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 725-26 (2000) [hereinafter LaPierre, 
Pandering to Public Fears]. 
 113. Shrink II, 528 U.S. at 397. 
 114. See Connolly, supra note 99, at 486 (calling the Eighth Circuit’s use of a comparative 
method by which it compared the limits deemed constitutional in Buckley to the limits established 
by various states as a “numbers game”).  See supra text accompanying notes 101-03 (discussing 
these Eighth Circuit cases). 
 115. Shrink II, 528 U.S. at 396. 
 116. Id. at 397.  When Shrink II returned to the Eighth Circuit after being reversed, Judge 
Pasco Bowman wrote a brief concurring opinion in which he stated: 
In [Shrink II], the Supreme Court has spoken in a way that subordinates core First 
Amendment rights of free speech and free association to the predilections of the 
legislature and the mood of the electorate.  Given the decision and the current political 
climate, we no doubt can expect further, even more draconian, efforts by government to 
restrict political speech  . . . . 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 204 F.3d 838, 843 (2000) (Bowman, J., concurring). 
 117. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 
(1996) [hereinafter Colorado Republican I].  During the 1986 Colorado senate campaign, the 
Colorado Republican Party aired television and radio advertisements criticizing incumbent 
Democratic Senator Tim Wirth.  The expense of these advertisements, which aired at a time when 
there were three Republican candidates seeking the Republican nomination, were above the limits 
established by FECA.  Id. at 608. 
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contributions at their root.118  Indeed, this very problem caused the Court to 
issue a narrow plurality opinion because no more than three justices could 
agree on the proper characterization of political party spending in the context 
of campaigns.119  In Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion, the Court based its 
holding on the “constitutionally significant fact” that Colorado Republican’s 
expenditure was independent of its candidates.120  The opinion avoided any 
statement that the parties enjoy a preferred position under the Constitution with 
respect to campaign spending and rejected the argument that a party and its 
candidates are identical.121  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justices 
Rehnquist and Scalia, rejected the notion of party independence from 
candidates, concluding that regardless of the nature of the expenditure, party 
spending ought to be constitutionally protected. 122  Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence, also joined by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, claimed that 
because party spending presents only a minimal danger of corruption, there 
exists no constitutional basis for its limitation.123  In a brief dissent, Justice 
 
 118. This is so because some individual or group must contribute money to a political party 
for it to have money to expend or contribute to a candidate. 
 119. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 613.  The Court refused to reach the facial challenge 
to the Party Expenditure Provision, choosing to consider only whether the provision as applied 
violated the First Amendment.  Id. 
 120. Id. at 617.  This is because the Republican candidate had not even been determined yet, 
therefore immunizing it to the danger of quid pro quo corruption.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 624.  The Court implicitly rejected the contention of the concurrences that parties 
are incapable of corrupting their candidates by commenting that parties and PACs share certain 
features.  Id.  Since the FEC could not prove that independent spending by parties was either 
impossible or corruptive, the plurality was forced to view this as an independent expenditure, 
acknowledging that because party expenditures do not fit neatly into any of Buckley’s conceptual 
boxes, it could not consider Colorado Republican’s broader challenge to the constitutionality of 
limits on any kind of party spending.  Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 624-25. 
 122. Id. at 630.  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion was extensively quoted by both the 
district court and the Eighth Circuit in Lamb, see infra Part III.B and Part III.C.  It explicitly 
rejected the plurality’s emphasis on the independence of Colorado Republican’s spending.  
Instead, Justice Kennedy stated there is a practical identity of interests between candidates and 
parties during an election and noted “the tradition of political parties and candidates engaging in 
joint First Amendment activity.”  Id.  In addition, he observed that a party’s fate is “inextricably 
intertwined with that of its candidates,” and that parties require candidates to make their messages 
known.  Id. 
  Acknowledging that party spending will tend to function as a contribution to a candidate, 
Justice Kennedy claimed that such spending by a party also represents spending on its own 
behalf.  For these reasons, he concluded that as the political speech of a political association, 
party spending, even where coordinated, could not be constitutionally limited.  Id.  However, he 
distinguished “undifferentiated” party contributions from coordinated expenditures, claiming that 
Congress may have authority to restrict undifferentiated contributions, but that these were “not at 
issue here.”  Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 630. 
 123. Id. at 646.  In his concurrence, Justice Thomas maintained that there is no danger of 
corruption where a party is supporting its own candidate.  He considered and responded to two 
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Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, stated that despite the unique relationship 
between parties and candidates, Congress could constitutionally limit all 
political party spending.124 
On remand, the parties to Colorado Republican compiled an extensive 
record in order to answer the broader question of whether the FECA’s limits on 
coordinated party expenditures were constitutional.125  The district court placed 
a heavy burden of proof on the FEC after weighing the First Amendment 
interests at stake.  It concluded that a political party has a First Amendment 
interest that is superior to that of individuals with respect to restrictions on 
campaign contributions.  Explaining that the First Amendment has its “fullest 
and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political 
 
possible sources of corruption.  First, he considered the influence of the party itself on the 
candidate, concluding that party influence could never be corruptive since “[t]he very aim of a 
political party is to influence its candidate’s stance on issues.”  Id.  Thus, he reasoned, if a party 
succeeds, “that is not corruption; that is successful advocacy of ideas in the political marketplace 
and republican government in a party system.”  Id. 
  Second, Justice Thomas considered the possibility of a donor exerting undue influence 
over candidates through the parties, concluding that parties have a diffusing effect which lowers 
any corruptive force.  Id.  He said that the “numerous members with a wide variety of interests” 
in a party make it unlikely that any particular member will be able to exact a quid pro quo from a 
candidate.  Id. at 647.  In addition, he explained that there is little risk that a wealthy donor could 
use a party as a “conduit” because Congress can still subject individuals to limits on contributions 
to the parties.  Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 646. 
  In a separate portion of the opinion, however, Justice Thomas said he would also regard 
such contribution caps as unconstitutional.  In that portion, he argued that there is no 
constitutional difference between a contribution and an expenditure and that, in his opinion, 
neither can be constitutionally limited.  Id.  The four justices represented in the two concurrences, 
therefore, all agree that the FECA’s ceiling on coordinated party spending, which the FECA 
defines as a contribution, should be held unconstitutional.  Hence, it would appear that only one 
more justice is needed to uphold the Tenth Circuit’s decision in the remanded portion of 
Colorado Republican I. 
 124. Id. at 648.  Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Kennedy that parties and candidates share 
a unique relationship, thus precluding a finding of independence.  Id.  However, he questioned 
Justice Thomas’s conclusion that a party’s coordinated spending cannot corrupt its candidates.  
Id.  Instead, he maintained that such spending could enable the party or those controlling its 
influence to influence the candidate “by virtue of its power to spend” and that the lack of limits 
would enable donors to use the party as a conduit.  Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 648.  In 
addition, he paid tribute to the political equality rationale, reasoning that a spending limit of this 
nature has the effect of leveling the electoral playing field.  Id. 
 125. Colorado Republican v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 213 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000) 
[hereinafter Colorado Republican Remand II].  The Supreme Court refused to reach this question 
in 1996 because a holding on coordinated expenditures would have implicated a broader range of 
issues, including the constitutionality of party contribution limits (since the FEC equates a 
coordinated expenditure to a contribution).  Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 624. 
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office,”126 and recognizing the historical importance of party involvement in 
campaigns, the court held unconstitutional the FECA’s Party Expenditure 
Provision, which restricted a party’s coordinated expenditures.127  On appeal, 
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.128  In doing so, the court 
questioned whether the contribution-expenditure dichotomy applied to political 
parties129 and discussed at length the important place of political parties in the 
American political system.130  The court also questioned the FEC’s anti-
corruption rationale for the restriction, pointing out that the idea that political 
parties can corrupt their candidates is a misunderstanding of the role of 
political parties in America.131  Because parties represent such a broad-based 
coalition of interests, the court reasoned that any corruptive force will be 
diluted.132  For these reasons, the court held that FECA’s Party Expenditure 
Provision constituted an unnecessary abridgement of a political party’s First 
Amendment rights.133  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to this case on 
October 12, 2000 and heard oral arguments on February 28, 2001.134 
The briefs that have been filed in Colorado Republican II indicate that the 
Court’s ruling will have far-reaching implications for America’s political 
parties.  Not only have both of the parties to Missouri Republican Party v. 
Lamb filed amicus briefs in the case, they also apparently agree that if the 
Court upholds the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, the regulation of political party 
support for candidates will effectively come to an end.135  This is so because, 
 
 126. Colorado Republican v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 41 F. Supp.2d 1197, 1209 (D. Colo. 
1999), (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)) 
[hereinafter Colorado Republican Remand I]. 
 127. Colorado Republican Remand I, 41 F. Supp.2d at 1214. 
 128. Colorado Republican Remand II, 213 F.3d at 1221. 
 129. Id. at 1227.  The court acknowledged that FECA labels a coordinated expenditure as a 
contribution.  Id. at 1226.  However, it stated that such a “cubbyholing” of constitutional values 
under labels such as contribution and expenditure “cheapens the currency.” Id. at 1232. 
 130. Id. at 1228.  Highlighting the fact that they are not “economic actors” in the same sense 
that individuals and PACs are, the court explained that all three branches of government rely 
heavily on the speech and associational functions of political parties to assure the orderly conduct 
of government, including elections and the appointment process.  Colorado Republican Remand 
II, 213 F.3d at 1227-28. 
 131. Id. at 1231 n.7. 
 132. Id. at 1231.  It even quoted the maxim of sanitation engineers: “the solution to pollution 
is dilution.”  Id. 
 133. Id. at 1232-33. 
 134. See 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000).  See also supra note 12. 
 135. See Brief of Amici Curiae State of Mo. at 8, Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Colorado 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2001) (No. 00-191), available at 2000 WL 1793085 
(“Because the Tenth Circuit’s holding is broad enough to cover expenditures regardless of the 
level of coordination—it would effectively end the regulation of financial support by political 
parties to candidates.”); See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Missouri Republican Party at 3, Fed. 
Elections Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2001) (No. 00-191), 
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as the Missouri Republican Party readily admits, parties typically do not make 
simple contributions to their candidates.136  In reality, all party spending is 
coordinated such that when funds are “contributed” to candidates, there has 
almost certainly been some discussion between the party and the candidate as 
to how those funds are to be used.137  Consequently, if the Supreme Court was 
to strike down limits on coordinated expenditures, it would essentially render 
moot the issue examined in Lamb—namely, limits on political party 
contributions.138  The oral arguments provided few hints as to how the Court 
will rule.  However, the positions of all but three of the justices were 
established in the four opinions written in Colorado Republican I.  Most 
commentators believe that Justice O’Connor will provide the swing vote 
because it appears that Justices Breyer and Souter will join Justices Stevens 
and Ginsburg in their support for coordinated expenditure limits.139  
Consideration of this case is taking place concurrently with debates on 
campaign finance reform in Congress, making the Court’s ruling an even more 
anticipated one.  This much seems clear at present: If the Court decides to 
affirm the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Colorado Republican II—a holding upon 
which the Eighth Circuit relied in Lamb—any legislative victory gained in 
Congress could be a pyrrhic one at best. 
III.  INSTANT DECISION: MISSOURI REPUBLICAN PARTY V. LAMB 
A. Introduction 
The dispute arose in November 1998 after the Missouri Ethics 
Commission informed plaintiffs they were in violation of Missouri Revised 
Statute section 130.032.4, which limits the amount of cash and in-kind 
contributions that a political party can make and accept in any one election.140  
 
available at 2001 WL 43223 (“The [Missouri Republican Party] provides financial support for 
Republican candidates only after consultation with the candidate and the candidate’s committee 
and in cooperation with the candidate and the candidate committee.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id.  See also Appellant’s Brief at 10, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 
1070 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-2686). 
 138. Nevertheless, the state argues in its petition for writ of certiorari that the need for review 
will actually be greater if the Court strikes down limits on coordinated expenditures, because the 
only remaining limits under the federal scheme would be those on contributions.  Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, Nixon v. Missouri Republican Party at 25 (No 00-1136). 
 139. Damon Chappie & Thaddeus DeJesus, High Court Hears Arguments in Colorado Case, 
ROLL CALL, Mar. 1, 2001 (noting that both Justices Breyer and Souter expressed concern in the 
oral arguments about the effects of removing another limit on the amount of campaign spending). 
 140. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp.2d 1161, 1162 (E.D. Mo. 1998) 
[hereinafter Lamb I].  The statute reads: 
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The plaintiffs included the Missouri Republican Party, three candidate 
committees and their treasurers and three state-level candidates, including the 
Republican candidate for state auditor, and candidates for two different state 
senate seats.141  One defendant, Charles G. Lamb, was the Executive Director 
of the Missouri Ethics Commission and other defendants included the 
chairperson and vice-chairperson of that commission and the Missouri 
Attorney General, Jeremiah W. Nixon.142 
In 1994, the Missouri legislature adopted the statute in question as part of a 
comprehensive campaign finance reform bill.143  The individual contribution 
limits that were part of that bill have also been challenged, and after the Eighth 
Circuit found them unconstitutional, the Supreme Court declared them 
constitutional in Shrink II.144  As will become evident, the district court relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Shrink II when making its decision 
regarding political party contributions.145  Under the statute, any committee 
that accepts or gives contributions in excess of the statutory limits is subject to 
a significant penalty, unless the contribution is promptly returned to the 
contributor after the Ethics Commission notifies it of the violation.146  The per 
 
Except as limited by this subsection, the amount of cash contributions, and a separate 
amount for the amount of in-kind contributions, made by or accepted from a political 
party committee in any one election shall not exceed the following: 
(1) To elect an individual to the office of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of 
state, state treasurer, state auditor or attorney general, ten thousand dollars; 
(2) To elect an individual to the office of state senator, five thousand dollars; 
(3) To elect an individual to the office of state representative, two thousand five hundred 
dollars; and 
(4) To elect an individual to any other office of an electoral district, ward or unit, ten 
times the allowable contribution limit for the office sought. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.4 (1999).  Missouri Revised Statute section 130.032.2 requires limits 
contained in section 130.032.4 be adjusted for inflation every even-numbered year by a 
calculation employing the cumulative consumer price index.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.2 
(1999).  In 1998, the Missouri Ethics Commission thus increased the limits in § 130.032.4(1)-(3) 
to $10,750, $5,250, and $2,750 respectively.  Lamb I, 31 F. Supp.2d at 1162.  Twenty-seven 
states limit the amount a political party can contribute to a candidate.  Seventeen states have 
scaled limitations and ten states have a singular ceiling.  The other twenty-three states do not limit 
political party contributions.  EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM & JAMES A. PALMER, FED. ELECTION 
COMM’N, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 2000: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 
WITH QUICK REFERENCE CHARTS chart 2-B (2000). 
 141. Lamb I, 31 F. Supp.2d at 1161-62. 
 142. Id. at 1162. 
 143. Both Senate Bill 650 and Proposition A amended Missouri’s Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Law.  MO. REV. STAT. § 130.011-.160 (1994 & Supp. 1998).  See also LaPierre, First 
Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18, at 218-19 (discussing the 1994 legislation in depth). 
 144. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 903 (2000).  See supra Part II.B.3 for a 
discussion of this case. 
 145. See infra Part III.B (dealing with the district court’s rationale for its holding in Lamb II). 
 146. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.7 (1999). 
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contribution penalty is $1000 plus an amount equal to the contribution.147  The 
candidate and the committee are personally liable for payment of the penalty, 
or alternatively, they may pay the penalty from the campaign funds existing on 
the date of notification by the Ethics Commission.148 
In the 1998 general election, the Missouri Republican Party made a 
number of monetary contributions to the other plaintiffs in the case (in 
particular, to each candidate’s committee).149  The Republican Party’s 
contributions to each candidate’s committee were in excess of the statutory 
limits.150  Consequently, in late October and early November 1998, the Ethics 
Commission separately informed each of the candidates that his committee 
was in violation of the section 130.032.4 limits and demanded that the party 
contributions be returned to the degree that they exceeded the limits.151  The 
plaintiffs then decided to file suit seeking to enjoin enforcement and to have 
the statute declared unconstitutional.152  The cause of action alleged that the 
provisions of the Missouri campaign finance statute that restricted political 
party contributions violated the party’s First Amendment rights under the U.S. 
Constitution.153 
On January 13, 1999, the district court decided, pursuant to previous 
Eighth Circuit cases declaring contribution limits unconstitutional, that 
plaintiffs had met the burden necessary to receive a preliminary injunction 
against enforcement.154  On March 1, 1999, the court stayed the proceeding 
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Shrink II.155  After Shrink II declared 
Missouri’s individual contribution limits constitutional, the state moved to 
vacate the preliminary injunction, which the district court denied, choosing 
instead to set the case for expedited briefing and a hearing on the merits.156  
The case was set for trial on July 5, 2000, but it never went to trial;157 on June 
22, 2000, the district court awarded summary judgment to defendants.158  The 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp.2d 1161, 1162 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1161. 
 154. Lamb I, 31 F. Supp.2d at 1163. 
 155. Brief for Appellant at 3, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 
2000) (No. 00-2686); Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp.2d 990, 992 (E.D. Mo. 
2000) [hereinafter Lamb II]. 
 156. Brief for Appellant at 4, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 
2000) (No. 00-2686).  Missouri filed a notice of appeal, followed by a motion to expedite the 
appeal, after the preliminary injunction was granted.  The Eighth Circuit, however, denied 
Missouri’s motions.  Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp.2d at 991. 
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court found that the Republican Party’s financial donations to plaintiff 
candidates were contributions rather than expenditures because the candidates 
had control over the use of the funds.  Thus, the court held that Shrink II 
required it to find the state’s limits on political party contributions 
constitutional.159 
B. District Court Rationale: A Contribution is a Contribution; Shrink II 
Governs 
One fact dictated the district court’s consideration of Lamb II—the fact 
that the campaign spending in question was a contribution as opposed to a 
coordinated or independent expenditure.160  After making the preliminary 
determination that these were contributions, Judge Catherine D. Perry161 began 
her analysis with two questions.162  First, were contributions made by political 
parties subject to the same standards applied to contributions made by 
individuals and entities other than political party committees, such as PACs?163  
Second, how could the limitations be effected?164  The court looked to Shrink 
II for the appropriate standard, explaining that contribution limits could survive 
if the government demonstrated that the regulation was closely drawn to match 
a sufficiently important state interest.165  Concerning the amount of the 
limitation, the relevant test was whether the limit was so radical as to render 
political association ineffective, thus driving out the sound of the candidate’s 
voice and making contributions worthless.166 
The court’s determination that these were contributions affected the 
standard of review it applied and thus the deference given to Missouri’s elected 
 
 159. Id. at 992, 994. 
 160. Shrink II upheld Missouri’s individual contribution limits and the district court found 
that because Missouri’s regulation was of a contribution, Shrink II required it to uphold the 
constitutionality of the regulation.  Id. at 992.  The Missouri Republican Party argued that the 
spending at issue was a coordinated expenditure.  Id. at 993-94.  In its opposition brief to the 
state’s petition for certiorari, the party maintained that there remains a substantial question in the 
case whether the lower courts properly labeled the support provided by the party to its candidates 
“contributions” instead of “expenditures.”  Brief in Opposition at 18, Nixon v. Missouri 
Republican Party (No. 00-1136). 
 161. U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, Catherine D. Perry, also 
authored the district court opinion in Shrink, an opinion the Supreme Court eventually agreed 
with.  Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp.2d 734 (E.D. Mo. 1998).  In addition, she 
authored one other campaign finance opinion.  Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 
1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995). 
 162. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp.2d at 995. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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decision-makers.167  Applying the intermediate scrutiny standard that the 
Supreme Court applied to contributions in Buckley, the court accepted the 
state’s two interests—anti-corruption and anti-evasion—as sufficient without 
specific evidentiary proof.168  Its understanding of Buckley and Shrink II led 
the district court to conclude that the constitutionality of a limitation hinges not 
on the identity of the contributor but on the type of financial support.169  
Because the type of support implicated in this case was a contribution, it was 
of little concern to the court that the contributor was a political party.  
Nevertheless, the court considered the Missouri Republican Party’s argument 
that contributions in the party-candidate context require a different analysis 
based on their common identity and the minimal corruption dangers.170  Judge 
Perry distinguished Justice Kennedy’s Colorado Republican I concurrence by 
pointing to Justice Kennedy’s statement that Congress may have the ability to 
restrict undifferentiated political party contributions.171  Because these 
contributions were precisely that, as opposed to coordinated expenditures, she 
reasoned that his conclusion was not applicable.172  In addition, while she 
found Justice Thomas’s opinion in that case persuasive, Judge Perry felt 
constrained to rely on Shrink II’s holding which found Colorado Republican I 
inapposite to the question of campaign contribution limits.173 
Having answered the “whether” question in the affirmative by finding that 
a contribution is a contribution, the court was easily able to satisfy Shrink II’s 
“sufficiently important interest” test.  This was so because both the state’s anti-
corruption and anti-evasion justifications are well-entrenched in the Supreme 
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.174  The court then turned to the “how” 
question, which examines the “closely drawn” element of the Shrink II test.  
 
 167. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp.2d at 995-96. 
 168. Id. at 998-99. 
 169. Id. at 996. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 997.  Judge Perry stated that “[u]nfortunately for [the] plaintiffs, [undifferentiated 
party contributions are] . . . exactly the type of regulation at issue here.”  Id.  See supra note 122 
for a discussion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Colorado Republican I. 
 172. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 997. 
 173. Id.  Judge Perry exclaimed that “[w]hile I find Justice Thomas’ reasoning concerning the 
nature of political parties appealing as a policy statement, I believe that [Shrink II] requires me to 
reject it for purposes of deciding this case.”  Id.  Her conclusion echoed this line of thought: 
Were I writing this opinion on a blank slate, I might well conclude that political parties 
should be exempted from the legal standards governing other kinds of campaign 
contributors because of their special role in American politics.  I might even adopt the 
approach advocated by Justice Thomas in Colorado Republican . . . . 
Id. at 1000.  See supra note 123 for a discussion of Justice Thomas’s Colorado Republican I 
opinion. 
 174. See supra note 110.  The Shrink II Court affirmed the strength of these justifications 
when regulating contributions. 
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Finding that these limits were not “so radical . . . as to render contributions 
pointless,” the court held that the statute was closely drawn to meet a 
sufficiently important interest and therefore was constitutional.175  The 
Missouri Republican Party appealed the district court’s decision to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  After hearing oral arguments, 
the Eighth Circuit handed down its decision on August 9, 2000.176 
C. Eighth Circuit Opinion: Political Party Contributions are Different; See 
Buckley and Colorado Republican I 
The majority opinion in Lamb III, written by Circuit Judge Morris 
Sheppard Arnold, agreed with the district court on one fact, that the spending 
in question was a contribution.177  However, the agreement ended there.  
Because of the identity of the contributor, the Eighth Circuit came to a 
conclusion different from that of the district court, basing its decision on 
different precedent.  Even though it applied the Shrink II standard, the Eighth 
Circuit claimed that Shrink II’s applicability was limited because the fact that 
the plaintiff was a political party distinguished the case “in a crucial way.”178  
Consequently, the court fit Lamb III between Buckley, which allowed 
limitations on individual contributions, and Colorado Republican I, which 
disallowed limitations on independent political party expenditures (with four 
justices arguing that coordinated expenditure limitations should also have been 
disallowed).179  Fueled by precedent of this nature, the court felt free to 
establish a new rule for political party contributions based on the Supreme 
Court’s description of a contribution in Buckley and its analysis of the party 
context in Colorado Republican I. 
By analyzing Buckley’s description of an individual contribution, which 
likened it to a “general expression of support” that did not communicate the 
underlying basis of the support, the Eighth Circuit found that these 
considerations did not carry the same force when applied to political party 
contributions.180  The court stated the object of a party is to elect candidates to 
 
 175. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 999. 
 176. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1070 (8th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter 
Lamb III]. 
 177. Id. at 1071.  The other circuit judges before whom this case was argued included Circuit 
Judge Pasco Bowman and Circuit Judge John R. Gibson.  For news coverage of the case, see Kit 
Wagar, Court Kills State Party Fund Limit; Missouri’s Nixon Vows to Appeal Ruling, KANSAS 
CITY STAR, Sep. 12, 2000, at A-1; Tim Bryant, Appeals Panel Rejects Limit on Campaign 
Spending by Parties; Judges’ Ruling Says Missouri Law Violates Free Speech Rights; Fight is not 
Over, Says Nixon, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sep. 12, 2000, at A-4. 
 178. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1072. 
 179. Id. at 1071. 
 180. Id. at 1072. 
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office.181  Consequently, the candidate’s speech is in many ways the party’s 
own speech such that they are “virtual alter egos.”182  Although it 
acknowledged that there are some observable differences between the two, the 
court concluded that the identities of a party and candidate merge in such a 
way that makes their dealings “more than merely transient symbiotic ones 
between separate and distinct entities.”183  For this reason, it becomes 
impossible to say in Buckley’s words, as the district court did, that a party’s 
contribution does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.184  
Indeed, the “ideological endorsement” and “philosophical imprimatur” that 
attach to this sort of contribution make it an altogether different thing than an 
individual contribution.185  Rather than serving as a symbolic expression, 
reasoned the court, a party’s contribution is more like a substantive political 
statement deserving of and requiring greater First Amendment protection.186 
Because the majority found a “weightier” First Amendment right, the court 
imposed a higher evidentiary burden on the state.  It reasoned that the nature of 
parties also affects the kind of reason the government must advance to justify 
an intrusion on First Amendment rights.187  Citing Justice Thomas’s Colorado 
Republican I concurrence, the court pointed out the logical weaknesses of the 
anti-corruption rationale in the party-candidate context.188  Because of their 
unity of purpose, it becomes difficult to imagine how a party could corrupt its 
own candidate, making the state’s evidentiary challenge an even tougher one in 
this context.  The court also questioned the state’s anti-evasion rationale on 
two grounds.  First, the court believed that this rationale worked in a way that 
burdened the free speech rights of parties to control the activities of someone 
else.189  Secondly, it pointed to already existing Missouri statutes which outlaw 
using parties or other political groups as conduits or means of circumventing 
individual contribution limits.190  The court acknowledged that this regulation 
might have an indirect attenuating effect on earmarking agreements (evasive 
behavior), but concluded that this rationale is too frail to justify a limitation on 
the substantial free speech rights of parties.191  Thus, the state failed to meet 
the higher evidentiary burden applied by the Eighth Circuit and instead fell 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1072. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1072-73. 
 189. Id. at 1073. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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victim to a holding that labeled its espoused interests “novel,” “implausible” 
and, therefore, unconstitutional in the party-candidate context.192 
D.  Gibson’s Dissent: Party-Candidate Unity is a Shifting Foundation; a 
Contribution is Still a Contribution 
Circuit Judge John R. Gibson concurred with the majority to the extent that 
it classified this type of spending as a contribution.193  He also agreed that 
Buckley and Colorado Republican provided guidance, but disagreed with the 
court’s conclusion that party contributions were distinguishable from the 
contributions described in Buckley and Shrink II.  Thus, he also took issue with 
the assertion that Shrink II was of limited value.194  Instead, he stated that 
Shrink II reinforced Buckley’s “continuing vitality” in maintaining that 
contributions impose less severe restrictions on First Amendment rights.195  In 
addition, he claimed that Shrink II provided the standard the court must use.196 
The basis for Judge Gibson’s dissent was his disagreement over the proper 
characterization of the party-candidate relationship.  He accused the majority 
of going back and forth between different sides as it reached for a 
description.197  For example, he pointed out that the majority acknowledged 
“observable differences” between the two while simultaneously concluding 
that they are “virtually indistinguishable.”198  On “this shifting foundation,” 
stated Gibson, the majority’s entire opinion is constructed.199  Referring to 
Colorado Republican I, Gibson claimed that there was no consensus on the 
Supreme Court about this relationship.200  To wit, the Colorado Republican I 
plurality rejected the argument that they are identical, “pointing out that 
Congress treats parties and candidates differently by regulating contributions 
 
 192. Id.  The court’s use of this language—basically the Shrink II test—caused the Missouri 
Republican Party to argue in its opposition brief to the state’s petition for writ of certiorari that 
the Court’s holding was merely a straightforward application of Shrink II.  Brief in Opposition, at 
12-13, Nixon v. Missouri Republican Party (No. 00-1136). 
  Shortly after the decision, a Missouri newspaper editorialized that the Missouri 
Republican Party won on the law but lost on the politics.  The reason for this was that following 
the abolishment of party contribution limits, the Missouri Democratic Party contributed $2.6 
million to its candidates, and the Missouri Republican Party contributed merely $600,000.  
Editorial, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sep. 13, 2000, at B6. 
 193. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1074. 
 194. Id. at 1073. 
 195. Id. at 1074. 
 196. Id.  Arguably, however, the majority used this standard, simply applying the test in a 
different manner than Circuit Judge Gibson would have. 
 197. Id.  Circuit Judge Gibson used the word “tergivisating.”  Id. 
 198. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1074. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
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from one to the other.”201  Even though four justices signed their names to 
concurrences which stressed the unity of party-candidate interests and 
behavior, two more justices in the dissent identified a special danger that 
parties will abuse the influence they have over candidates based on their power 
to spend.202  Finally, Gibson claimed that Justice Kennedy’s conclusion, the 
one he said the majority opinion was most similar to, fell short of the 
majority’s conclusion that parties and candidates were virtually identical or 
merged into one.203 
Regardless of the nature of the relationship, Judge Gibson argued that the 
Buckley analysis was framed in a way that leads to the conclusion that its 
reference to contributions applies to all contributions, no matter what their 
source.204  Buckley stated that the FECA “appl[ies] broadly to all phases of and 
all participants in the election process.”205  In addition, claimed Gibson, it 
discussed contributions and expenditures in a part of the opinion entitled 
“general principles,” which indicated that the Court was intending to set forth 
universally applicable concepts.206  Moreover, the Court’s use of the word 
“group” in the paragraph directly following its discussion of political parties 
indicated that it intended its description of contribution limits in that paragraph 
to apply to all the groups referred to in the previous paragraph.207  Part of that 
description included the notion that a contribution limit entailed only a 
marginal restriction on free speech.208  Gibson argued these constructional 
details would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court attaches constitutional 
significance to the contribution-expenditure distinction in the political party 
context.209  If this were so, the free speech rights of parties would be no greater 
than the free speech rights of individuals.  Under this framework, a 
contribution is a contribution, and the same level of scrutiny is thus warranted. 
Judge Gibson then applied the Shrink II test which upheld restrictions if 
they were closely drawn to meet a sufficiently important interest.210  First, he 
found the state’s anti-evasion rationale enough to meet the sufficiently 
important interest test because the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the 
appearance of corruption can be rooted in the suspicion that individuals can 
evade limits by using parties as a conduit.211  Second, he found that these 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1075. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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 207. Id. 
 208. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1075. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 1077. 
 211. Id. at 1076. 
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justifications were neither novel nor implausible because both anti-corruption 
and anti-evasion rationales were used and considered plausible in previous 
cases dealing with contribution limits.212  He stated the majority’s insistence on 
evidentiary proof ran afoul of those previous decisions.213  Finally, finding the 
limits to be “closely drawn” such that they would not suppress political 
advocacy in Missouri, Judge Gibson stated he would have affirmed the district 
court’s judgment.214 
At the time of publication of this Note, the state’s petition for writ of 
certiorari was pending before the Supreme Court.  In the briefs submitted, each 
side made its arguments in view of the Court’s upcoming Colorado Republican 
II decision.  The state argued that Lamb III bridges the gap between Shrink II 
and Colorado Republican II by addressing the constitutionality of limits on 
political party contributions.215  It offered the Supreme Court two choices: (1) 
if the Court reverses the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Republican II, it argued the 
Court should grant the writ, vacate the decision and remand back to the Eighth 
Circuit with instructions to reconsider in light of the Court’s new precedent;216  
(2) if the Court affirms the Tenth Circuit, the state argued that the need for 
review would be even greater because the only existing constitutional 
restriction on political party support under the federal scheme would be the 
party contributions that the Eighth Circuit held unconstitutional.217  In 
response, the Missouri Republican Party argued that Lamb III was simply a 
straightforward application of Shrink II whereby the Eighth Circuit found that 
the threat of a political party corrupting its candidates was both novel and 
implausible.218  It claimed that the Court’s decision in Colorado Republican II 
is not likely to create any reason to question the Eighth Circuit’s application of 
Shrink II to limits on the amount of financial support provided by parties to 
 
 212. Id.  For example, he cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) and California Med. 
Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1981). 
 213. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1076. 
 214. Id. at 1077. 
 215. Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 19, Nixon v. Missouri Republican Party (No. 00-1136).  
In addition, the state argued that the Eighth Circuit’s holding threatens a substantial disruption of 
the statutory scheme (and, thus, upcoming congressional action) and that a conflict currently 
exists among the courts on whether contribution limits are constitutional.  Id. at 20, 24. 
 216. Id. at 24. 
 217. Id. at 25.  In its Colorado Republican II brief of amici curiae, however, the state 
indicated if the Court decides to affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision to strike down limits on 
coordinated expenditures, then all limits on political party support to candidates will effectively 
come to an end.  Brief of Amici Curiae State of Mo. at 8, Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Colorado 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2001) (No. 00-191); see also supra note 135.  Hence, it 
would seem that the need for review would actually not be great were the Court to strike down 
coordinated expenditure limits. 
 218. Brief in Opposition at 10, Nixon v. Missouri Republican Party (No. 00-1136). 
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candidates.219  Thus, it concluded that the state’s petition for writ of certiorari 
should be denied.  It is doubtful that the Court will rule on the petition until it 
hands down its Colorado Republican II decision.220 
IV.  ANALYSIS: DON’T SILENCE THE LAMB 
Like Judge Gibson and the Lamb II district court, Missouri’s campaign 
finance reformers put great stock in the contribution expenditure distinction 
first explicated by the Supreme Court a quarter of a century ago.221  This 
distinction has been greatly criticized, however, as this Note has already 
indicated.222  The problem with the distinction is both a constitutional problem 
and a political effects problem.  The constitutional problem is that the rationale 
for the distinction is questionable.  As Chief Justice Burger suggested in 
Buckley, the Court’s attempt to justify the distinction by identifying two 
different communicative aspects of contributions, the moral support they 
convey and the fact that they translate into communication, is flawed because 
the end result of a contribution is often identical to the end result of an 
expenditure.223  The political effects problem is evident in the process by 
which money, which has been and will likely remain a constant in elections, 
flows to less accountable sources of expenditures, like PACs, in order to avoid 
the contribution caps.224 
While the point of this analysis is not to deconstruct the Supreme Court’s 
contribution expenditure distinction, it will begin by considering the weakness 
of such categorization in the political party context.  It will then discuss the 
 
 219. Id. at 12, 22.  The party further argued that Missouri can provide no evidence that 
political party contributions cause corruption or the appearance of corruption.  Id. at 10.  It also 
claimed that a substantial question remains as to whether the spending at issue in the case was a 
contribution as opposed to a coordinated expenditure.  Id. at 18.  In addition, the party claimed 
that the current posture of the case, whereby the record is somewhat scant due to the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment and the Eighth Circuit’s reversal of that grant, presents many 
unresolved issues that would control the outcome of the case notwithstanding review by the 
Supreme Court.  Id. at 21. 
 220. There is good reason to believe the Court will rule on the petition for writ of certiorari on 
the same day it hands down its Colorado Republican II decision, because that is precisely what it 
did in two prior Missouri campaign finance cases, denying certiorari on the same day the 
Colorado Republican I decision was handed down.  See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); see also, LaPierre, Pandering to Public Fears, 
supra note 112, at 700. 
 221. Brief for Appellee at 16, 23-31, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (No. 00-2686).  In its brief, Missouri argued that Shrink II affirmed Buckley’s bright 
line distinction between contributions and expenditures.  Hence, the state believed that the fact 
that political party contributions were the target of the legislation should have been dispositive. 
 222. See supra Part II B.2.b. 
 223. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 243-44. 
 224. See Sullivan, Against Reform, supra note 41, at 325-26. 
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role of the modern political party in order to demonstrate that embracing the 
political parties as a means to solve the present real and perceived campaign 
finance problems is consistent not only with the First Amendment but also 
with the political realities that face the United States today.  The application of 
this informed view of the political parties and their role in the electoral 
process, as occurred by the majority in Lamb III, would increase accountability 
in the political sphere and lessen the influence of secondary and tertiary 
political actors like PACs.  Additionally, it will be shown that the effects of 
this idea may in fact serve the desires of the reformers even more completely 
than the reformers’ regulations could, were they found to be constitutional.225 
A. The Tyranny of Labels: “Word Game” Jurisprudence 
Even though the Supreme Court has claimed that the government’s label 
does not control its analysis,226 the two labels at issue in the campaign finance 
context almost always control both the Court’s level of scrutiny and its finding 
regarding the constitutionality of any regulation of campaign spending.227  
There are two primary criticisms of the contribution expenditure distinction.228  
First, “it is difficult to accept the view that contributions do not measure the 
intensity of support or that the quantity of communication does not increase 
with the size of the contribution.”229  Second, as Justice Burger pointed out, the 
nature of the speech, regardless of whether it is a contribution or an 
expenditure, is arguably the same because the final product is so often the 
same.230 
The Buckley Court, however, ignored this second critique, choosing 
instead to rest its justification for the distinction on the premise that limitations 
of contributions affect only speech by another or “speech by proxy.”231  Justice 
Burger called this an arbitrary limitation, whereby the Court imposed a flat 
ceiling without focusing on the actual harm worked apart from the 
limitation.232  Furthermore, he stated that under this framework, whether 
speech is an impermissible contribution or a permissible expenditure turns not 
 
 225. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 226. “[W]e cannot allow the Government’s suggested labels to control our First Amendment 
analysis.” Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 
627 (1996). 
 227. See supra tbl. 1 and accompanying text (supporting the idea that these labels have 
controlled the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence). 
 228. Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns 
and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 83 (1987). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  For example, a television commercial carrying an election message could be the 
product of either contributions from persons or groups to the candidate or independent 
expenditures from persons or groups on behalf of the candidate. 
 231. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 243 (1976). 
 232. Id. at 244 n.6. 
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on whether the speech is by proxy, but rather on whether the speech is 
authorized by the candidate.233  Thus, the distinction is really one between 
independent and authorized political activity.234  Calling this distinction 
unrealistic, Burger concluded that the Court was engaging in a “word game” 
by not recognizing that people contribute money to political actors and 
activities “because they wish to communicate ideas, and [that] their 
constitutional interest in doing so is precisely the same whether they or 
someone else utters the words.”235 
This “word game” critique has caused some to question whether the 
distinction provides “a reliable barometer of the relative significance of the 
first amendment values at stake” and whether it alone should trigger different 
levels of scrutiny.236  “An individual[‘s] choice to have a message with which 
he agrees prepared by professionals [to have another speak for him by proxy] 
is no less speech” than the real speech (expenditures) that the Supreme Court 
protects.237  Because of this, the conclusion that the distinction is flawed and 
that the level of scrutiny should not differ seems warranted.238  One might, 
however, point to the differing risks of corruption that accompany 
contributions and expenditures, according to the Supreme Court, as support for 
the distinction.  FECA’s creators believed that large contributions create a 
greater risk of quid pro quo corruption because contributions may be given 
directly to candidates in hopes of securing a quid pro quo from the candidate 
should he or she experience electoral success.239  Independent expenditures, 
however, are indirect and for that reason would seem less susceptible to the 
dangers of quid pro quo corruption, the primary justification accepted by the 
Supreme Court for limiting political speech.240 
Many reformers, however, “do not suggest that most contributions and 
expenditures fall into the quid pro quo category.”241  Instead, they argue that 
contributions exert a more subtle influence by increasing the access of 
moneyed interests who, they claim, already have more than enough access.242  
Thus, it would appear the limitation is, to some degree, an attempt to redress a 
perceived generalized imbalance of power, rather than the actual practice of 
 
 233. Id. at 244. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. BeVier, Money and Politics, supra note 91, at 1063. 
 237. Id. at 1064. 
 238. Id. at 1063. 
 239. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
 240. See supra Part II B.2.a (discussing the anti-corruption rationale). 
 241. BeVier, Money and Politics, supra note 91, at 1082-83. 
 242. Id.  Professor BeVier makes this comment in her article.  Further support for this idea is 
found in journalist Elizabeth Drew’s first book on politics and money.  ELIZABETH DREW, 
POLITICS AND MONEY 59 (1983). 
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exchanging money for votes.243  While justifications of this nature are seldom 
articulated, it does seem clear, based on the state’s inability to produce any 
evidence, that the quid pro quo corruption that most contribution limits aim to 
address is more of a perception than a reality.244 
Moving from the justifications to the effects, present political realities 
demonstrate that the contribution expenditure distinction has produced a 
campaign finance system far different from what reformers envisioned.245  
According to Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan, Buckley has 
produced a system in which candidates must contend with an unlimited 
demand for funds because expenditures cannot be capped and a limited supply 
of funds because contributions are capped.246  This increases the value of the 
commodity (campaign money) such that candidates are constantly preoccupied 
with fund-raising.247  As the professors relate, it is like allowing a starving man 
unlimited trips to the buffet table, but forcing him to use a thimble-sized spoon 
to serve himself.248  As with food, such constricted means are likely to create a 
singular obsession with consumption.249  Because contribution caps remove the 
possibility of large direct contributions, candidates must spend more time 
chasing smaller contributions to satisfy their need for money.250  The perverse 
effect of reform, then, is to increase the amount of time and energy that 
modern candidates spend on fund-raising, thus decreasing the amount of time 
and energy they spend on governing.251 
Another theory advanced by Professors Issacharoff and Karlan to describe 
the weaknesses of the present campaign finance structure is what they term the 
“hydraulics of campaign finance reform.”252  Like water, they posited, political 
money must go somewhere, and it is part of a broader ecosystem (the current 
 
 243. BeVier, Money and Politics, supra note 91, at 1082. 
 244. See LaPierre, First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18, at 218.  Professor LaPierre 
claimed that Missouri’s 1994 campaign finance legislation pandered “to public perceptions about 
the amorphous evils of ‘big money.’”  One legislator even remarked to him that “perception is 
more important than what’s real” in the campaign finance reform arena.  Id. 
 245. See Nahra, supra note 228, at 83-84. 
 246. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1711 (1999).  Professors Issacharoff and Karlan have both commented on 
campaign finance reform both prior to and after this particular joint effort.  See, e.g., Samuel 
Issacharoff, Introduction: The Structures of Democratic Politics, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 593 
(2000); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not By “Election” Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1173 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, Symposium: Defining Democracy for the Next Century: Loss and 
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 247. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 246, at 1711. 
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 251. Id.  Of course, this effect does not hold for the self-promoting superrich candidate, who 
may, as the authors point out, be the least qualified to hold public office.  Id. 
 252. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 246, at 1708-09. 
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political landscape, which includes PACs, special interest groups, corporations, 
soft money and independent expenditures).253  If money has the outcome-
determinative effect on campaigns that reformers identify, they reasoned, then 
wealthy political operatives will continue to use it to influence outcomes 
whatever the regulatory regime.254  This is especially true in a country that 
guarantees free speech, equating money spent to create speech as speech.  
When you apply this principle to a finance structure that limits contributions to 
primary actors like candidates and parties, thus forcing money upstream to 
secondary and tertiary actors like PACs, you get a system where candidates are 
not only “perpetual fundraisers” but also more and more indebted to entities 
like PACs and others who make independent expenditures.255 
These effects only affirm what many have thought since day one: it is time 
for the word game to end.  At least with respect to contributions between 
primary actors such as political parties and candidates, the contribution 
expenditure distinction should be abolished.  By refusing to accept the artificial 
distinction between contributions and expenditures, the Eighth Circuit in Lamb 
III held at bay the movement of money upstream, enabling it to remain within 
entities that voters can hold accountable.  This is a positive effect, as well as an 
example that other jurisdictions, including the Supreme Court, should follow.  
For, as the professors conclude: “[T]here are serious reasons to think we would 
be better off if individuals and institutions who are entitled to advocate views 
or express themselves were to do so through the mediating institutions of 
broad-based political parties.”256 
B. The Modern Political Party: A Campaign-Centered Institution 
In its brief, the state of Missouri implicitly argued that parties occupy the 
same ground as PACs when it comes to their role in the political realm and the 
freedoms associated with that role.257  Circuit Judge Gibson also argued in his 
dissent that the Buckley court intended to lump political parties in with other 
 
 253. Id.  See also generally Marshall, supra note 39 (discussing the unintended consequences 
of campaign finance reform); Smith, supra note 40 (discussing the undemocratic consequences of 
campaign finance reform); Sullivan, Against Reform, supra note 41 (discussing the substitution 
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“groups,” including PACs, when it discussed how contribution limits 
operated.258  This comparison, that of parties to PACs, because it has played an 
outcome-determinative role in courts’ constitutional analysis, has caused 
commentators to speculate about whether the differences are differences in 
degree or differences in kind.259  Before considering the modern political party 
and the activities that set it apart from other groups, it is helpful to take a brief 
look back at the role and development of the political parties in America. 
America’s two major political parties have existed virtually since the 
beginning of the republic.260  In an age lacking the easy means of 
communication that exist today, the original parties found their niche by 
developing institutional means for coordinating elections, by communicating 
between electors and officials and by influencing and guiding legislative 
behavior.261  They became an effective mechanism for aggregating individual 
interests and resources into a coherent program.262  The local party structure 
dominated and even provided an important social service function to members 
of the local community.263  In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the welfare state 
began to supplant the social service function performed by the parties.  In 
addition, the parties also became less involved in the process of selecting 
nominees for office, causing commentators to decry the decline and weakness 
of the political parties in America.264  Consequently, in the period just prior to 
the FECA’s passage and the Buckley holding, party regulations were not a big 
concern of the reformers.265  For this reason, both Congress in the FECA and 
the Court in Buckley essentially ignored the parties in their analysis of the 
constitutionality of various campaign finance reforms.266 
Despite its failure to directly consider parties, Buckley, in addition to the 
1979 amendments to the FECA, forged a different role for the political 
parties—one that they appear to be flourishing in today.267  Today’s political 
parties are national and statewide organizations that focus on providing 
campaign services rather than distributing the spoils of local government 
elections.268  Their new role has made the parties major players in the federal 
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and state campaign process, where they are significant providers of campaign 
services and campaign funds.269  This is despite being limited on both the 
supply and demand side of contributions, because individuals are often limited 
as to the amount they can contribute to parties and parties are often limited as 
to the amount they can contribute to, or spend in cooperation with, candidates.  
Limitations of this nature would suggest not only that parties are like PACs, 
but also that the differences that do exist create an even greater risk of 
corruption because the limitations are in some ways more severe than those on 
PACs.  A closer look at party behavior, however, especially with respect to the 
campaign process, will demonstrate that parties and special interest groups like 
PACs are distinguishable in a crucial way. 
In his book Party Politics in America, Frank Sorauf identified five major 
differences between political parties and other interest groups.270  The first 
difference is the extent to which political parties pursue their activities through 
the contesting of elections.271  The parties field candidates at every level.272  
PACs can only support individuals already engaged in the process of 
campaigning under the auspices of a party, making their involvement 
secondary.273  The second difference is that parties must be broad and inclusive 
to succeed.274  They cannot afford to be exclusive or to focus on a narrow 
range of concerns because their goal is to attain the support of a majority of the 
voting public.275  PACs, however, are typically the political arms of a narrow 
special interest group that has involved itself in the political process solely to 
benefit its own narrow special interest.276  The third difference is that political 
parties operate solely in the political arena to effect political goals and 
purposes.277  They are not economic actors, nor do they have as a goal the 
advancement of non-political agendas, as many PACs and special interest 
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groups do.278  The fourth difference is that political parties persist over time 
whereas special interest groups tend to move into and out of existence, 
depending on the success of their particular agenda.279  Parties are therefore 
able to fulfill a stabilizing function in American political life that special 
interest groups do not contribute to.280  Finally, the fifth difference is that 
political parties serve as cues and reference points for voters as they select 
issues and candidates who they might otherwise know little about.281  Special 
interest groups cannot serve this function because their selection is more 
arbitrary, often based not on a policy stance, but rather on who is likely to 
win.282  Sometimes, special interest groups give money to candidates from both 
parties in order to hedge their bets and ensure themselves some access to 
political actors regardless of who wins.283 
Many of these differences between PACs and parties suggest a shared 
identity between the modern political party and its candidates, the extent of 
which was hotly disputed in Lamb III.284  The question is whether the party and 
its candidates are in effect one.  While it is easy to see that the two are not 
identical, it is apparent both from the concurring opinions in Colorado 
Republican I and the majority opinion in Lamb III that the level of 
interdependence is great enough to conclude that the relationship warrants a 
different kind of First Amendment analysis.  As one commentator noted, a 
political party is like a candidate’s extended family.285  They are subdivisions 
of an indivisible whole such that neither can function without the other.286  
This is especially true when examining the parties.  Were it not for candidates, 
the parties would clearly be out of business.  Although it is not as evident that 
the candidates need a party to function, virtually all candidates choose to ally 
themselves with the parties and lean on them for the many benefits they 
provide, demonstrating that the relationship is more than a mere symbiotic one 
between separate entities.287  Indeed, by providing access to a preexisting 
network of supporters and helping with start-up and maintenance costs, parties 
are typically necessary vehicles for candidates to achieve electoral victory.288  
In that regard, parties have become essential to the orderly functioning of 
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democratic governance.289  The end result of the interdependence and 
mutuality of interests between parties and candidates is that it is very difficult 
for corruption to exist in the party-candidate context.  Without engaging in 
either word or metaphysical games in order to properly categorize the spending 
and relationships that characterize this context, it seems fair, based on the well-
recognized qualities of the modern political party, to make this conclusion. 
C. The Effects of Removing Party Limits: More or Less Corruption? 
It is well established that the only justification allowed by the Constitution 
for limiting the political speech contained in a contribution is the prevention of 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.290  The reformers have other goals 
as well, including leveling the electoral playing field to create political equality 
and lowering the overall amount of money spent on campaigns.291  Based on 
the “hydraulic principle” identified above, it is debatable to what degree the 
overall amount of money spent on campaigns can be regulated or in some other 
manner restrained.  By comparing the present FECA-based system employed 
by many states, including Missouri, with a system that puts less restrictions on 
primary actors like candidates and political parties, one will discover that a 
system that does not restrict parties is superior to a system that treats them like 
narrow special interest groups or individuals.  The political parties actually 
provide a means through which to accomplish the reformers’ goals.292  Striking 
down limits on parties to support candidates not only reaffirms constitutional 
principles, it assists the reformers’ goals of minimizing corruption, developing 
an open political system where candidates can compete on a level playing field 
and providing for public disclosure of spending activity.293  Striking down 
political party limits is consistent, not so much with the reformers’ idealized 
notion of what the American political system should look like, but rather with 
political realities that exist today based on all of the factors that bear on the 
systems’ objective reality. 
The campaign finance system involves a choice between options.  The 
FECA-based option currently being employed by the federal government and 
many states tends to regulate accountable actors like candidates and political 
parties more than unaccountable actors like PACs and activities like issue 
advocacy.  Noted constitutional scholar Kathleen Sullivan identified the 
“upstream” effects of restricting some political speech through contribution 
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caps as “substitution effects.”294  The substitutes she identified (PAC spending, 
soft money, issue advocacy) take the place of the political money that would 
otherwise go to candidates or political parties.295  The current system thus 
creates incentives to shift political spending away from candidates and parties 
to secondary organizations which cannot be held accountable by voters.296  
Because these substitution effects cannot be constitutionally limited, the 
current system also creates a safe harbor for political behavior that is perverse 
from the standpoint of uninhibited political debate.297  For example, the 
Missouri Republican Party alleged in its brief that a system which forces it to 
make independent expenditures instead of coordinated or direct contributions 
is less effective because it requires the party to engage in negative advertising 
and prevents it from presenting a united ticket to the state.298  The kind of 
“issue advocacy” engaged in by special interest groups, a political behavior 
that falls totally outside the control of the candidate or the party, is another 
example of a perverse effect.  The advantages that wealthy candidates have 
over non-wealthy ones and that incumbents have over cash-starved challengers 
are further examples.299  Based on the negative effects of the present reform 
regime, a better solution in this choice between options would begin with the 
abolishment of contribution caps between political parties and candidates. 
The Eighth Circuit struck down party contribution limits because it found 
them unconstitutional.  There are good reasons to conclude that the court’s 
decision was also smart policy.  Candidates and political parties provide a 
mediating influence in electoral politics because of their shared need to steer a 
middle course to gain or retain office.300  Single-issue interest groups have no 
such influence on the political realm.  Instead, they divide and conquer.301  
Political money will be spent no matter what.302  By keeping it at the level of 
candidates and parties, both of whom must engage in the give and take of 
coalitional politics, stake out positions across a variety of issues, and answer to 
voters, the removal of party limits minimizes the role of substitution effects.303  
In addition, this process may reduce the overall effect of money on campaigns 
by keeping it at a level where it can be better moderated and controlled.304  
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This was the conclusion of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Wisconsin 
Campaign Finance Reform.305  Observing that independent expenditures fueled 
by narrow interest groups and individuals were increasing, leaving candidates 
less in control of their campaigns, the Commission saw substantial benefits to 
having campaigns centered on candidates and political parties.306  This, 
however, does not answer the question posed above: Whether more or less 
corruption will inhere in a system that favors candidates and political parties 
compared to the special interests advantaged under most current reform 
agendas? 
While candidates and political parties are not identical, their common 
electoral interests and coinciding common incentives to steer a middle course 
minimize the corruption risk, making a policy position that favors them better 
than all the other options.  The funding gap created by contribution caps 
funnels money to PACs and special interest groups whose political behavior is 
more likely to raise the specter of corruption or at least pollution.307  Because 
the public tends to view the activities of such groups, due to their narrow 
interests, with more skepticism than they view candidates acting within the 
realm of party politics, it would appear that limits on parties have the effect of 
eroding the public’s confidence in the purity of the election process.308  
Because of this, some have suggested that money that flows through political 
parties to candidates is the cleanest money in politics.309  Alluding to the Tenth 
Circuit’s recent use of the “solution to pollution is dilution” maxim, these 
advocates argue, quite convincingly, that the aggregation of money in parties 
will diffuse any real or perceived undue influence that might arise from a 
contribution made by an individual source.310 
The reformers, however, are likely to counter that “conduit” corruption is 
the real threat when it comes to removing party limits.311  This refers to the use 
of the parties by individuals or special interest groups as a conduit, enabling 
them to circumvent any limits that exist on the direct contributions of these 
groups.  In response to this argument, one might point to the fact that it is 
illegal under the FECA and most FECA-based systems to do this and adequate 
disclosure provisions enable policing to occur.312  Alternatively, some would 
argue that conduit corruption is not a real threat and that all contribution caps, 
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including those on individuals and special interest groups, should be 
abolished.313  Under such a system, two things would happen: first, aggressive 
disclosure would enable voters to become aware of the likelihood of undue 
influence themselves; and second, money would flow back to the primary, 
moderating influences of candidates and parties.314  While this Note does not 
aim to address this possibility, it would seem logical to conclude that giving 
the parties a bigger role in the channeling of money from contributors to 
candidates reduces the possibility of corruption in a more effective manner 
than any other constitutional alternative. 
Not only would the removal of party limits, whether by the courts or by the 
legislature, minimize corruption, it is clear that encouraging parties to become 
a preferred vehicle for contributions from the public would serve a number of 
positive public policy ends, including the following: it would enable candidates 
to run effective campaigns that they can control;315 it would diminish 
challenger concerns about fund-raising, reducing the advantage currently held 
by both incumbents and independently wealthy candidates;316 it would thus 
contribute to the leveling of the electoral playing field, helping satisfy the oft-
repeated desire of reformers to create political equality;317 it would diminish 
the impact of PACs and other non-accountable special interest groups;318 and it 
would strengthen the parties’ ability to achieve policy coherence and mobilize 
majorities in Congress.319  The removal of party limits might, however, entail 
some costs, and the reformers’ concern about the increased use of the parties as 
a conduit to get around other restrictions is probably the chief one.320  
Decisions about the campaign finance system must occur with an eye toward 
political realities, though, including the freedoms guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.321  Because of the close relationship between parties and 
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candidates and the unique role of parties in the election process, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, where accompanied by an aggressive disclosure 
regime, a finance system that favors the parties involves less risk of corruption 
than any other system that might be enacted under our Constitution. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Note has demonstrated why political party freedoms should not be 
sacrificed at the altar of campaign finance reform.  While Missouri’s reformers 
certainly meant well, the unconstitutional nature and unintended side effects of 
a campaign finance system that restrains a party’s ability to support its 
candidates precluded their success.  Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb was 
certainly a victory for advocates of free speech.  But, in truth, the reformers did 
not lose much here.  In fact, the removal of contribution caps with respect to 
political parties is a policy choice that offers many benefits, not the least of 
which is stemming the tide of money flowing to non-accountable political 
actors and activities.  In addition, a world without party limits may actually be 
one in which the reality and perception of corruption is less, assuming other 
means are used to prevent any use of the parties as a means to circumvent other 
limits. 
Very soon the Supreme Court will issue its decision in Colorado 
Republican II.322  This will certainly give the Court an opportunity to provide 
more clarity to its campaign finance jurisprudence, especially as it relates to 
the party-candidate relationship.  Unlike Colorado Republican I, it does not 
appear that the Court will be able to sidestep the “broader” constitutional 
questions that it neglected to rule on last time.  It is presently unclear whether 
the Court will decide to finally abolish the contribution expenditure distinction 
and if so, whether they will do so in a manner that finds limits on both or limits 
on neither acceptable.323  Perhaps, the Court will retain the distinction but 
exempt political parties from contribution limits based on their unique identity, 
finding a weightier First Amendment right, much like the Lamb III court did.  
One  can  only  hope  that  the Court  will  not  send the  political  parties to the 
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slaughter.  Because if they do, it is clear that the campaign finance system in 
this country will become even more messy than it already is. 
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